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Positive Constitutional Economics II—A Survey of Recent Developments 
1. Introduction 
The economic analysis of constitutions, also known as “constitutional economics” 
or “constitutional political economy,” is a young research program. Standard 
economics used to focus on the analysis of choices within rules, thus assuming 
rules to be exogenously given and fixed. Constitutional economics broadens this 
research program by analyzing the choice of rules, using the established method 
of economics, i.e., rational choice. 
Two broad avenues can be distinguished in the economic analysis of 
constitutions. (1) The normative branch, which is interested in legitimizing the 
state and its most basic rules by drawing solely on the self-interest of rational 
individuals. This branch is interested in proposing Pareto-superior rule changes. 
The normative approach is dominated by adherents to social contract theory. 
According to Buchanan (1987, 249), the purpose of this contractarian approach is 
justificatory in the sense that “it offers a basis for normative evaluation. Could the 
observed rules that constrain the activity of ordinary politics have emerged from 
agreement in constitutional contract? To the extent that this question can be 
affirmatively answered, we have established a legitimating linkage between the 
individual and the state.” 
(2) The positive branch, which is interested in explaining (a) the (economic) 
effects of alternative constitutional rules and (b) the emergence and modification 
of constitutional rules. Some 25 years ago, two public choice-scholars questioned 
the relevance of normative theory, stating that “it is extremely doubtful whether 
such analysis will make a perceptible difference in the character of prevailing 
institutions. Normative theory is useful in helping us clarify our norms, but it is 
another question whether such analysis will impact on the pattern of real 
institutional development” (McCormick/Tollison 1981, 126). These scholars 
clearly preferred a positive approach, but were rather critical in their evaluation of 
the state of the art of positive theory: “There is thus a sharp contrast in the two 
approaches to constitutional-institutional analysis. It is also fair to say, however, 
that at this point in time the normative approach to constitutional analysis is much 
better developed in the literature than the positive approach.” 
This critique was written more than a quarter-century ago and in my first survey 
of positive constitutional economics (Voigt 1997), I was forced to agree that 3 
McCormick and Tollison’s conclusion still held.2 Over the last dozen years, 
however, this situation has changed dramatically and constitutional political 
economy (CPE) has been discovered by the mainstream. Ten years ago, many 
important contributions to the emerging research program appeared in Public 
Choice or in Constitutional Political Economy, a journal expressly founded in 
1990 to give the research program a push. Today, many important contributions to 
the field can be found in journals such as the American Economic Review, the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, and the Journal of Political Economy, to name 
three of the most prominent ones. 
A number of factors appear to have played a role in the very rapid development of 
positive constitutional economics (PCE)? The demise of the socialist countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the subsequent need for well-informed policy 
advice made it very clear that economists had unduly neglected the relevance of 
institutions. During transition, the importance of institutions simply could not be 
ignored any longer. Solid and empirically tested knowledge is a necessary 
prerequisite to sound policy advice. It is no accident that PCE and the new 
institutional economics (NIE) appeared on the scene almost simultaneously. The 
failure of socialism made the dichotomy between socialism and capitalism largely 
irrelevant and led to a more focused look at institutional variation within market-
oriented countries. Djankov et al. (2003) call for a “new comparative economics” 
on precisely that basis. Another factor that contributed to the rise of PCE is the 
availability of data sets covering a wide range of variables, which has been a 
definite boon for cross-country analyses. 
The contributions to the positive branch appear somewhat unbalanced in that most 
of them deal with the economic effects of constitutions and only a handful speak 
to the emergence and modification of constitutional rules. In a way, endogenizing 
constitutions can be considered the core of the research program. To analyze the 
effects of constitutions first is, however, entirely straightforward: if constitutional 
rules did not have any significant effect on economic outcomes, expending effort 
on explaining their emergence would be pointless. However, there is now 
substantial evidence that constitutional rules do have important economic effects. 
                                                 
2  Other more recent surveys include Brennan and Hamlin (2001) as well as Kurrild-Klitgaard and 
Berggren (2004). Congleton and Swedenborg (2006) describe how constitutional political economy 
emerged out of the broader public choice research program and relate this root to the other two 
roots, namely, the new institutionalism and political economy. Voigt (2003) contains a collection of 
the seminal articles of the last four decades. 4 
It is thus time to take the next step—that is, to endogenize constitutional rules. 
This might be easier said than done, though, because although constitutions are 
frequently  rewritten,3 constitution writing is a rare event and the number of 
observations on which econometric evidence can be based is correspondingly low. 
Constitutional choice systematically takes place under very special circumstances 
and there are dozens of potentially relevant determinants. Although quite a few 
impressive case studies have been done, we are still a far cry away from a 
“general” theory that can even be tested empirically. Indeed, some might question 
the “theorizability” of this issue altogether. 
This survey is divided into three main parts: conceptual foundations (Section 2), 
description of recent trends (Section 3), and some speculation as to future 
developments (Section 4). Surveys should not only describe the current state of 
the art, but should also point out shortcomings and desiderata. This paper is 
therefore not simply a survey, but also an outline of a—subjective—research 
program. 
2. Conceptual Foundations 
Prior to addressing the real core of this survey, a number of preliminaries need to 
be dealt with first. These include (1) showing PCE’s position as part of a broader 
research program, namely, the NIE, (2) defining some key terms, (3) briefly 
discussing the variables we would like to explain, and (4) addressing several 
issues in measuring both constitutional aspects as well as explananda. 
2.1. Constitutional Political Economy as Part of the New Institutional 
Economics 
Scholars working within the NIE analyze (i) the (economic) effects of alternative 
institutions and (ii) the determinants of institutional change (see, e.g., North 1981, 
1990). Institutions can be defined as commonly known rules used to structure 
recurrent interaction situations that have a sanctioning mechanism that can be 
employed in cases of noncompliance or disregard of a rule. Voigt and Kiwit 
(1998) propose distinguishing between external and internal institutions: external 
                                                 
3  Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2006) count 736 constitutions written and promulgated since 1789, 
implying an average rate of 3.5 per year. According to the Asian Development Bank (2005), a total 
of 122 constitutions have been adopted between 1990 and 2004, most of them in Africa (54) and 
Asia (38). 5 
ones being those where the sanctioning is carried out by the state and internal 
institutions being those where society does the sanctioning. As long as 
constitutional rules are viewed as a specific kind of institution, the NIE can be 
interpreted as the more inclusive research program. Surveys or textbooks on NIE 
might reasonably be expected to include the economics of constitutions, but they 
usually do not. Neither the book-length survey by Eggertsson (1990) nor the one 
by Furubotn and Richter (1997) pays special attention to constitutional rules (both 
surveys do, however, include a chapter on the theory of the state in which the 
emergence of states is conceptualized using the economic approach). In short, 
representatives of both research programs seem to treat each other with benign 
neglect. 
It is argued here that PCE could profit immensely from positioning itself within 
the broader NIE.4 The normative branch of constitutional economics has been 
dominated by contractarian approaches (e.g., Buchanan 1975), in which a very 
broad capacity to deliberately set and modify constitutional rules is at least 
implicitly assumed. Additionally, it is often assumed that the actors choosing the 
constitution have at their disposal complete and perfect knowledge concerning the 
consequences of alternative constitutional arrangements. These two assumptions 
are neither realistic nor adequate for understanding how constitutions do actually 
evolve. If these assumptions are abandoned, an important issue can be dealt with 
explicitly, namely, that the enforcement of constitutional rules is precarious and 
depends on a number of conditions that ought to be identified. Factual 
enforcement could, e.g., depend on “preconstitutional” internal institutions. These 
internal institutions could thus constitute hard constraints regarding the 
enforceability of constitutional rules (for a more complete argument on the 
relationship between internal institutions and the enforcement of constitutional 
rules, see Voigt 2008). 
                                                 
4  Brennan and Hamlin (1995, 289) apparently argue exactly the opposite: “This account of 
constitutionalism is broad enough to include the approach to economic and political questions 
often termed ‘new institutionalism’. Indeed we see very strong links between that approach and 
CPE. Possible distinctions between CPE and the new institutionalism arise from the new 
institutionalists’ relative emphasis on institutional evolution rather than constitutional design, their 
relative emphasis on transactions costs, and the different normative structures employed.” 6 
2.2. Definitions 
Economists have analyzed constitutions from many different angles, including, 
but certainly not limited to, as a social contract, as an incomplete contract, as a 
principal agent relationship, as a precommitment device, as the result of cultural 
evolution, and as a bundle of conventions. In this survey, I draw on results from 
different perspectives, so it seems appropriate to choose a wide definition of 
“constitution.” 
Constitutions are concerned with mechanisms for the production of public goods. 
By giving themselves constitutions, societies are not deciding in any meaningful 
detail what sort of public goods they want to provide themselves with;5 rather, the 
constitutions contain provisions that are intended to be used in making those 
decisions. They therefore constrain the representatives of society in the ways they 
choose what public goods should be produced. At the same time, they also enable 
politicians to make choices. If one is interested in analyzing a society’s choice of 
constitution, one is really interested in analyzing a meta-choice, namely, how a 
society chooses (on the constitutional level) how to choose later on (on the 
postconstitutional one). Or, in the words of Peter Ordeshook (1993, 231f.): “A 
constitution is not a piece of legislation; it is the mechanism people use to guide 
the formulation of legislation and law.” 
Any state that produces a minimum amount of public goods can thus be said to 
have a de facto constitution. This is, however, not the same as having a 
constitution in the sense of constitutionalism, which is concerned with limited 
government and thus with constraining government action to certain areas and 
restricting the means government can employ.6 Societies in which the government 
stays within the limits laid down by the constitution are said to have an effective 
constitution or, in other words, there is convergence between the society’s de jure 
and de facto constitutions. 
                                                 
5  Note that, literally, it is always individuals—never societies at large—who choose. We thus are not 
departing from methodological individualism but simply saving space when we write that “societies 
choose.” 
6  Within the (Western) tradition of constitutionalism, much emphasis has been placed on the 
constraining side of constitutions. Ever since Thomas Hobbes, the state has been portrayed as 
Leviathan. However, compared to anarchy, the state can also make everyone better off, a view that 
should lead to equal emphasis on the enabling parts of the constitution. 7 
2.3. Explananda 
When constitutional rules are assumed to be exogenously given, they serve to 
explain different (economic) variables. But what are the variables in which we are 
specifically interested? For economists, it seems obvious to analyze the 
relationship between the constitutional-rule system and per capita income or its 
growth. It has been argued (e.g., by Hall and Jones 1999) that growth fluctuates 
widely over time within countries and that the results of any study are thus 
heavily dependent on the time period analyzed. One way to circumvent this 
problem is to use per capita income as explanandum as it reflects aggregate 
growth over a very long period. 
Another way to circumvent the problem is to use labor and/or total factor 
productivity. Conceptually, this makes a great deal of sense since we are not 
interested in output increases achieved by augmenting capital or labor input, but 
in increases in output that are achieved by using constant amounts of these factors 
in a more productive way. Institutions—including constitutional rules—should 
thus display their effects primarily via increases in productivity.7
Growth, per capita income, and labor, as well as total factor productivity, are 
“very macro.” Assuming that constitutional rules have a significant impact on 
these factors, we would be very interested in the transmission channels through 
which these impacts occur. This means that we are interested in some variables 
that are a bit “less macro.” 
Fiscal policy variables are a natural starting point. The state has the power to tax, 
but it also has the power to provide public goods. The extent and efficiency of 
both taxation and the provision of public goods might be affected by 
constitutional rules. It therefore seems appropriate to add (1) tax revenue and (2) 
government spending, as well as (3) the structure of government spending 
(reflecting the kinds of public goods provided) to our list of variables of interest. 
Government efficiency in the provision of public goods should also be reflected in 
low levels of corruption, few political rents handed out via regulation, and so 
forth. If constitutional rules have a significant impact on these variables, it implies 
the existence of an indirect channel through which the rules have an effect on 
income and total factor productivity. 
                                                 
7  This is not to deny that adequate institutions will also increase the propensity to invest in both 
physical as well as human capital. 8 
Table 1: Overview of Dependent Variables 
  Dependent Variables  Potential Problems with Most Frequently Used Proxies 
I  Macro Outcome Variables   
1  Economic Growth  Often very volatile over time; period of analysis chosen crucial 
2  Per Capita Income   
3 Labor  Productivity 
4  Total Factor Productivity 
Both labor and total factor productivity are calculated on a uniform Cobb-
Douglas production function for all countries 
II  Fiscal Policy Variables   
1 Government  Revenue   
2  Government  Expenditures    Focus is often on central government, which might considerably 
underestimate overall state activity 
3 Budget  Deficit   
4 Composition  of  Government 
Spending 
Focus on social and welfare spending; measures that distinguish between 
general public goods and others highly desirable 
III  Governance Variables   
1  Corruption  All the measures available for a large number of countries measure 
perceptions and are highly subjective 
2  Efficiency of Government  Measure based on a variable number of surveys; highly subjective and 
drivers difficult to determine 
IV  Others   
1 Legitimacy  of 
Constitution/State 
Subjective indicator; uncertain whether people really act on declared 
beliefs 
2  Propensity  to  Cheat  on  Taxes  Subjective indicator; uncertain whether people really act on declared 
beliefs 
3 Reported  Life  Satisfaction 
(“Happiness”) 
Subjective indicator; unclear how systematic collective sentiments 
(pessimism/optimism) can be controlled for 
 
Finally, there are a number of variables usually treated with some suspicion by 
economists, including fuzzy concepts such as the legitimacy of the constitution or 
its “stability.” Nevertheless, we plead for their inclusion as dependent variables in 
PCE. If it can be shown that some constitutions or the procedure by which they 
are generated are systematically perceived as more legitimate than others, then 
this might cause important economic effects: for example, the state’s monitoring 
costs would be less, which could mean lower taxes and higher income. One might 
also be interested in the propensity of citizens to cheat on taxes. Likewise, if the 
stability of a political regime is significantly influenced by its constitution, this 
would amount to a hitherto neglected transmission channel (from constitutional 
rules via stability and investment to income). A further explanandum of interest 
could be the degree to which constitutions enable citizens to form expectations 
that have a high chance of being correct. Institutional economists stress the 
uncertainty-reducing function of institutions. Constitutional rules that increase 
predictability might have important economic consequences, such as citizens 
acting on longer time horizons and having a higher propensity to make long-term 
investments. Another variable that promises to be of interest is the level of 
reported life satisfaction (aka “happiness”). 9 
We have now identified four groups of potentially interesting explananda, which 
are summarized in Table 1. Two measurement issues will be discussed in the next 
section: first, issues concerning how to measure the four groups of dependent 
variables just discussed and, more importantly, (2) issues related to the difficulty 
of measuring the constitutional rules themselves. 
2.4. Measurement Issues 
Empirical work in PCE presupposes that both constitutional rules and outcome 
variables are measurable in a satisfactory fashion. In this subsection, we deal with 
both types of variables, beginning with the measurability of constitutional rules. 
Prima facie, ascertaining currently valid constitutional rules is not a problem, 
since constitutions (almost) always exist in written form. Yet, a formally 
unchanged section of the constitution can be subject to very different 
interpretations over time (Voigt 1999, chapter 7). However, let us assume that we 
are not dealing with constitutional interpretation, but simply with constitutional 
basics. The more relevant problem now is the potential divergence between a 
constitution’s formal provisions and their actual implementation. 
Many real-world constitutions promise paradise on earth: extensive negative 
rights (protecting citizens from intrusion by the state) are happily married to 
extensive positive rights (promising citizens everything from the right to a paid 
nap at work to the right to housing, employment, and a clean environment). Of 
course, many of these protections and promises never manifest. Thus, when trying 
to estimate the consequences of constitutional rules, a formidable problem arises 
as the economic effects will most likely not be the result of these unenforced 
constitutional protections and promises, but are are far more likely to be due to the 
way the constitutional rules are actually implemented. Further complicating the 
issue is that nonenforced constitutional provisions are not confined to human 
rights but may well involve the organizational structure of the state: for example, 
the constitution could declare the judiciary independent of the executive but, in 
actual fact, this is not always the case.8
                                                 
8  Of course, one can simply count instances in which de jure rules have not been enforced factually: 
presidents running for a third term although there is a two-term limit, state governments overturned 
as a consequence of the national government demanding so, and so forth. It is unclear, however, 
whether this would produce a complete measure of the degree to which de jure rules are factually 
enforced. 10 
A related problem occurs when constitutions contain provisions that can be 
exercised, but rarely are (e.g., referendums). Some would argue that simply by 
being possible, these provisions have an effect on political behavior, and this is 
certainly plausible. However, this assumption might be proven wrong empirically. 
This is why it is important to not only measure formal provisions, but also 
investigate their actual use. 
Many of the measures used in the empirical papers discussed in the next section 
are dummy variables: a country has a presidential or a parliamentary form of 
government; it has a unicameral or a bicameral legislature; it has a federal or a 
central structure; and so forth. By necessity, dichotomous variables do not allow 
taking institutional detail into consideration. But if God (or the devil!) is in the 
details, perhaps the details are worth a little of our time, and the construction of 
more precise indicators a worthy pursuit. 
Let us now take a look at the outcome variables. Particular emphasis is given to 
the variables used by Persson, Tabellini, and various co-authors (PT) (e.g., 2003). 
PT gave PCE a real boost and their approach has already become a sort of 
standard framework for other studies. It thus seems appropriate to take a critical 
look at the outcome variables they employ. Estimates of labor and total factor 
productivity must, by necessity, rest on sweeping assumptions. PT use estimates 
arrived at by Hall and Jones (1999) and rely on an identical Cobb Douglas 
production function for all countries. It is assumed that all countries have an 
identical α (= 1/3), that marginal returns from (school) education are decreasing 
but identical the world over, that the amount of investment is known and that its 
depreciation is also identical the world over, and, finally, that GDP is known. On 
this basis, the Solow residual can be calculated. Obviously, a very crude measure 
results.9
For government revenue, PT rely on central government revenue. Their chief 
reason for not relying on total government revenue is “data availability and 
comparability” (2003, 38). It is conceivable, though, that central government 
revenue might vary considerably depending on whether the state is federal or 
unitary. PT control for this with a dummy for federalism but the control can only 
be as good as the dummy. Similar arguments can be made with regard to (central) 
government expenditure and budget surplus since the last variable is based on the 
                                                 
9  Hall and Jones calculate productivities for 1988. Using their assumptions, we recalculated the 
measures for the year 2000 (Blume and Voigt 2007). Partial correlations are 0.972 and 0.899 for 
labor and total factor productivity, respectively. 11 
two previously discussed variables. To analyze the effects of constitutional rules 
on the structure of the budget, PT construct a variable that captures the amount of 
central government expenditures on social services and welfare as a percentage of 
GDP. The same criticism applies.10
When it comes to the so-called governance indicators, PT’s true interest lies in the 
amount of political rents. However, such a measure is not available so in lieu 
thereof they rely on various corruption perception indices. Of course, political 
rents are not identical with perceived corruption and thus constructing political 
rent indicators remains a desideratum. There is no getting around that the 
perceptions indicators are subjective and that subjective perceptions can be 
heavily influenced by recent events, even by recent reports in the press of a long-
ago corruption scandal. Objective corruption indicators have been constructed 
(e.g., road construction in Italy [Golden and Picci 2005] or Indonesia [Olken 
2007]), but it hardly seems possible to construct them on a broad basis for many 
countries, and so this area continues to be a desideratum. To estimate the effect of 
constitutional rules on the efficiency of government, PT rely on the governance 
indicators provided by the World Bank Institute. Next to government efficiency, 
they also include a cluster called “graft.” Both indicators have been passionately 
attacked. The main critique is that they are not based on a thoroughly 
systematized concept but that the (implicit) definition of the various concepts is 
based on the availability of surveys. Since the variables employed change over 
time, so does the underlying implicit definition of the concept purported to be 
measured, which makes comparison over various years impossible. The indicators 
are not supplied as absolute values but as rankings. Once the number of included 
countries changes, the ranking of a country can change without any substantial 
change having taken place within that country.11
In sum, neither the operationalization of constitutional rules nor that of the 
potential outcome variables is without problems, a situation that must be kept in 
                                                 
10  PT choose social and welfare spending as a proxy for broad redistributive programs as opposed to 
narrow geographical constituencies. They point out (2003, 50) that this interpretation of the variable 
might not apply to less-developed countries. More fine-grained indicators are certainly desirable: if 
one thinks of government spending as either allocation-improving or redistributive on the one hand 
and broad (nation-wide) or narrow (local, geared at particular districts, etc.) on the other, then a 2 x 
2 matrix results in which social and welfare spending would cover only one cell. 
11  Critics include Arndt and Oman (2006), Knack (2006), Thomas (2006), and Kurtz and Schrank 
(2007a, 2007b). Kaufmann et al. (2007) is a reply to critics. 12 
mind when interpreting the estimation results. However, it is also a situation that 
should encourage the construction of better variables. 
3. Positive Constitutional Economics 
3.1. Introductory Remarks 
In this section, an overview of research concerning constitutional rules is 
provided. The presentation is structured so that the constitutional rule is first 
assumed to be exogenously given (or explanans) and only in a second step 
endogenized (or considered to be the explanandum).12 Within this broad division, 
theoretical insights are always presented prior to empirical results. 
As mentioned above, Persson and Tabellini, and various co-authors, have made a 
major contribution to PCE, which, although sometimes heavily criticized,13 has 
become almost a standard for analyzing the economic effects of constitutions. 
They analyze the economic effects of two constitutional institutions, namely, 
electoral systems and form of government. Since there is a fair amount of 
evidence available regarding these two institutions, we begin our survey with 
them. Of course, many other constitutional institutions promise to have important 
economic effects. The organization of the judiciary, and the effect of same on 
traditional separation of powers, immediately comes to mind, for example, 
although, strangely, this is an institution only recently analyzed by scholars. Here, 
                                                 
12  This is also why the relevance of procedural rules, as well as the relevance of preferences for the 
choice of constitutional rules, are dealt with only at the end of this section: they are concerned with 
endogenizing constitutional choice and change. 
13  PT are remiss about paying tribute to some of their intellectual predecessors, which has led to some 
controversy (Blankart and Koester 2006, severely criticizing proponents of political economics; 
Alesina, Persson, and Tabellini, 2006 responding). In his review of PT (2003), Mueller (2007) 
mentions a “disturbing development” in the literature, namely, “the tendency to re-label public 
choice and then pretend one has discovered something new.” Mueller extends his criticism to 
Daron Acemoglu as well as Shleifer and Vishny (who reinvented rent-seeking by calling it “the 
grabbing hand”). After praising their work, Acemoglu (2005) goes on to criticize PT by discussing 
the nonexogeneity of constitutional rules as well as the inadequate instruments they chose. 
Holcombe (2001) is a survey on the relevance of institutions for economic growth from the 
perspective of a public choice scholar. In his recent overview of “The New Political Economy,” 
Besley (2007) discusses historical antecedents at length and includes both comparative economic 
systems and public choice. 13 
the economic effects of judicial organization will be discussed as part of the 
(horizontal) separation of powers. 
The economic effects of both federalism and direct democracy have been dealt 
with by well-established branches within the public choice field. Although 
excellent surveys on both topics are available, they are also dealt with here in 
order to focus specifically on their constitutional aspects. Federalism can be 
interpreted as a vertical separation of powers; direct democratic institutions as an 
extension of the traditional notion of the separation of powers. In recent years, 
traditional government functions have ever more frequently been delegated to 
independent and specialized domestic or international agencies (monetary policy 
has often been delegated to independent central banks aiming at price stability, to 
name only the most prominent example). Additionally, in order to better monitor 
government, traditional organizations, such as supreme audit institutions, have 
often been strengthened or entirely new institutions created (e.g., freedom of 
information acts intended to increase government transparency). These 
developments may well deserve a heading of their own—“the new separation of 
powers” (see Ackerman 2000, who uses the term slightly differently). Both 
factual developments as well as research into these institutions are so manifold 
that they deserve a survey of their own; however, the most important of these 
developments are also surveyed here. 
The following subsections thus cover electoral rules (Section 3.2), the horizontal 
separation of powers, including forms of government (presidential vs. 
parliamentary democracy), bicameralism, and the judiciary (Section 3.3), the 
vertical separation of powers, or federalism (Section 3.4), the “new” separation of 
powers (Section 3.5). and direct versus representative democracy (Section 3.6). 
Subsequently, basic rights are dealt with in Section 3.7, followed by the relevance 
of procedural rules for effectuating constitutional rules (Section 3.8), the number 
of (constitutional) veto players (Section 3.9), and the dichotomy between 
autocracy and democracy (Section 3.10). Section 3.11 contains a summary. Table 
3 is a nonexhaustive list of the empirical papers cited in this section. 
3.2. Electoral Rules 
A distinction is sometimes made between electoral rules and electoral systems. 
Electoral rules refer to the way votes translate into parliamentary seats: under 
majority rule (also called plurality or first-past-the-post), only the candidate who 
secured the most votes in a district is elected; all other votes are “lost” or 
“wasted.” Under proportional representation, parties are allocated seats according 14 
to the proportion of votes they obtain. Electoral systems include more dimensions 
than electoral rules, e.g., district size and ballot structure. District magnitude 
refers to the number of parliamentarians sent from one district. The ballot 
structure determines whether citizens can vote only for a party, only for an 
individual, or some combination thereof. Although theoretically distinct, these 
dimensions are highly correlated empirically: countries using majority rule (MR) 
often have minimum district size (single-member districts) and allow voting for 
individual candidates. Countries relying on proportional representation (PR) often 
have large districts and restrict the possibility of deviating from party lists. 
Political scientists have studied the relationship between electoral rules and party 
structures as well as types of government (single party or coalition) for a long 
time. Grofman and Lijphart (1986) contains 19 contributions surveying well-
researched areas, as well as pointing out underresearched areas.14 Their book is 
aptly entitled Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences as economic 
consequences of electoral systems are not the central focus. Shugart (2005, 50f.) 
summarizes the state of the art, writing that the core questions are settled and the 
main findings incorporated into mainstream political science. This would, 
however, cease to be the case if electoral systems are endogenized. 
It has been known for many years that electoral rules can have a crucial effect on 
the number of parties. Duverger’s (1954) observations that MR is conducive to 
two-party systems, whereas more parties are apt to arise under PR has even been 
called “Duverger’s law” or “Duverger’s hypothesis,” which is some measure of 
their general validity. The analysis of the economic consequences of electoral 
systems is of a more recent vintage. It has been argued (Austen-Smith 2000) that 
since coalition governments are more likely under PR than under MR, a common 
pool problem among governing parties will emerge. Parties participating in the 
coalition will want to please different constituents, which explains why both 
government spending and tax rates are, on average, higher under PR than under 
MR. Lizzeri and Persico (2001) compare the composition of government spending 
                                                 
14  Drawing on Fishburn (1983), they name five areas that have received considerable attention 
(electoral formulas, ballot structure, district magnitude, size of legislature, and number of 
candidates/parties) and no less than 13 areas that deserve more attention (suffrage and registration 
requirements, ease of voter access to electoral process, ease of party/candidate access to political 
process, structure of political competition, special features of ballot format, special features for 
transforming votes into outcomes, districting procedures, campaign financing rules, campaign 
timing rules, other features of campaigning, number and types of offices subject to electoral choice, 
degree of “bundling” elections, and mechanisms for voter intervention). 15 
under alternative electoral rules. They distinguish between the provision of a 
genuine public good on the one hand and pork-barrel projects that serve to 
redistribute on the other and ask whether incentives to provide these goods differ 
systematically between MR systems (which they term “winner-take-all systems”) 
and PR systems. In MR systems, politicians have an incentive to cater to those 
who can help them obtain a plurality of the votes and they will do so by promising 
pork-barrel projects. In PR systems, on the other hand, targeting makes less sense 
because every vote counts, leading politicians to provide more general public 
goods. 
The hypotheses presented so far all refer to the electoral rules. In their survey on 
the economic effects of electoral systems, PT (2003) also investigate district size 
and ballot structure. Suppose single-member districts are combined with plurality 
rule, which is often the case empirically. In this situation, a party needs only 25% 
of the national vote to win the elections (50% of half of the districts; Buchanan 
and Tullock 1962). Contrast this with a single national district that is combined 
with PR. Here, a party needs 50% of the national vote to win. PT (2000, chapter 
9) argue that this gives parties under a PR system a strong incentive to offer 
general public goods, whereas parties under plurality rule have an incentive to 
focus on the swing states and promise policies that are specifically targeted at the 
constituents’ preferences. 
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002) obtain a similar result. In large 
districts, legislators will primarily represent socioeconomic groups, whereas in 
small districts, they will primarily represent geographical interests. Transfers are a 
suitable instrument for paying allegiance to social constituencies, whereas (local) 
public goods are better suited for paying for geographical allegiance. The authors 
assume that in majoritarian systems just one representative is elected in each 
district, whereas in proportional systems, more than one representative is elected. 
Given this assumption, governments under proportional systems will spend more 
on transfers, whereas governments under majoritarian systems will spend more on 
(local) public goods. They test their model with 20 OECD and 20 Latin American 
countries and find that, as predicted, transfers are higher under PR. Going beyond 
the simple dichotomy between majoritarian and proportional systems, they find 
that higher degrees of proportionality are correlated with higher degrees of 
transfer spending (as opposed to public goods spending). 
The effects of differences in ballot structure are the last aspect of electoral 
systems to be considered. Often, MR systems rely on individual candidates, 
whereas proportional systems rely on party lists. Party lists can be interpreted as a 16 
common pool, which means that individual candidates can be expected to invest 
less in their campaigns under PR than under MR. PT (2000, chapter 9) argue that 
corruption and political rents should be higher the lower the ratio between 
individually elected legislators and legislators delegated by their parties. 
Persson et al. (2004) is based on a game-theoretic model that takes the electoral 
system as exogenously given and analyzes a direct as well as an indirect causal 
chain from the electoral system to economic policy. The paper is in line with 
political science literature on the topic but explicitly adds economic policy as the 
last element of the chain. The model predicts that government spending will be 
higher under PR than under MR. In addition, it shows that party fragmentation 
can persist under MR if voters for different parties are unevenly distributed across 
districts.15
PT are to be congratulated for having put these conjectures to an empirical test 
involving as many as 85 countries over a period of almost four decades (1960–
1998). They (2003) find that the electoral system has (economically and 
statistically) significant effects on a number of economic variables. 
1. In majoritarian systems, central government expenditures are some 3% of GDP 
lower than in PR systems. 
2. Expenditures for social services (“the welfare state”) are some 2 to 3% lower in 
majoritarian systems. 
3. The budget deficit in majoritarian systems is some 1 to 2% below that of 
systems with PR. 
4. A higher proportion of individually elected candidates does indeed lead to 
lower levels of (perceived) corruption. 
5. Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have more corruption. 
                                                 
15  Recently, Bordignon and Tabellini (2008) took a further step toward the explicit recognition of 
institutional detail with regard to electoral systems. In some MR systems, citizens are permitted to 
vote a second time, namely, to determine the winner among the two candidates who received the 
most votes in the first round (the most prominent example being French presidential elections). 
The authors ask whether the dual ballot impacts upon the number of parties (candidates) and their 
positions. They show that the number of parties is, indeed, larger under the dual ballot but that the 
influence of more extreme positions is reduced under this institution. 17 
6. A higher proportion of individually elected candidates leads to higher output 
per worker. 
7. Countries with smaller electoral districts tend to have lower output per worker. 
Blume et al. (2009a) replicate and extend PT’s analysis, finding that with regard 
to various dependent variables, district magnitude and the proportion of 
individually elected candidates is more significant—both substantially and 
statistically—than the electoral rule itself. 
Persson  et al. (2004) explicitly discriminate between a direct and an indirect 
effect. Their hypothesis is that the electoral system influences government 
spending only indirectly, via the party structure and the type of government. They 
test this idea by using indicators for the electoral system as instruments for party 
fragmentation. The dependent variable of the second stage is either type of 
government or (central) government spending. Since the over-identifying 
restriction that the electoral system variables do not display a direct effect on 
government spending cannot be refuted, Persson et al. consider this as support for 
their hypothesis. Overall, the district size variable has more significant effects 
than the electoral rule variable (MAJ), which is accordance with the political 
science literature. Indeed, Taagepera and Shugart (1993, 455) note that “if one 
had to give a single major factor [that] determines the number of parties … it 
would have to be the district magnitude.” 
Iversen and Soskice (2006) deal with the effects of electoral systems on 
redistribution. They question the Meltzer-Richard (1981) model, according to 
which nonegalitarian societies redistribute more than egalitarian ones. They notice 
that three out of four governments under majoritarian systems were center-right 
between 1945 and 1998, whereas three out of four governments were center-left 
under PR. However, if that is the case, a closer look at the transmission 
mechanism between electoral systems to government expenditures is needed 
because it is unclear if the difference is due to the constitutional rule or due to the 
different government ideologies. Picking up on Acemoglu and Robinson (2000; 
see below), they argue that PR can be interpreted as a commitment device in favor 
of redistribution (which they interpret as a kind of insurance against loss of 
income in case of unemployment, which would, in turn, increase incentives to 
make specific investments in human capital). 
If the choice of electoral systems has important economic consequences, it seems 
only natural to ask what factors determine this choice. This is exactly what will be 
done next. PT use instrumental variables to explicitly take account of the fact that 18 
institutions are never truly exogenous, but their instruments (time period during 
which the constitution was written, distance of the country from the equator, 
percentage of population speaking English or another European language as the 
mother tongue, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, and population size) cannot 
comprise a fully fledged theory. 
Colomer (2005) argues that it is the number of parties that determines the 
electoral system and not vice versa. In other words, he turns Duverger’s law 
upside down.16 He assumes that “the presumed line of causality is double.” His 
empirical test covers 87 countries and 219 elections. He observes 37 changes from 
MR to PR. He states (ibid., 12) that “multi-party systems occur before and not 
only subsequent to the adoption of PR.” He also finds support for a long-term 
trend toward PR, a finding previously made by Lijphart (1994, 52–56). 
Boix (1999) asks under what circumstances incumbent parties will change 
electoral systems. He starts from the assumption that incumbents are interested in 
maximizing their parliamentary representation (as well as government positions). 
The emergence of new parties is modeled as an exogenous shock that can, e.g., be 
caused by a move toward universal suffrage. If the newly emerging parties 
(usually leftist) are perceived as weak, the electoral system remains unchanged; if, 
on the other hand, the new parties are perceived as strong, electoral systems 
change from majoritarian to proportional rule. Boix tests this hypothesis for the 
electoral systems of 22 countries between 1875 and 1990 and finds it broadly 
confirmed. Further, he shows that the consequences of a country’s internal 
fragmentation (measured by ethnic as well as religious fragmentation) depend on 
the size of the country: in small countries, high levels of fragmentation are one 
factor leading to PR. Large countries can be highly fragmented at the national 
level, yet quite homogenous at the local or regional level. If this is the case, 
federalism serves as a substitute for PR.17 To model the emergence of new parties 
as an exogenous shock even though it is the consequence of a move toward 
universal suffrage, and hence an endogenous choice, is somewhat unconvincing. 
Cusack et al. (2007, 373) attack this argument as “wrong in terms of the logic, the 
interpretation of the historical record and the cross-national evidence.” They 
                                                 
16  Additionally, he conjectures that there is a long-term trend toward PR. 
17 Aghion  et al. (2005) endogenize the choice of electoral rules in U.S. cities in a very similar fashion. 
Here, the external shock is the general enlargement of the franchise to minorities. The authors show 
that small minorities will induce the majority to keep first-past-the-post systems, whereas large 
minorities will induce the majority to switch to proportional representation. 19 
endeavor to show that “PR cannot be the equilibrium choice of right parties under 
the assumptions of the model.” 
Benoit’s (2004) intention is to develop a rational choice model of electoral system 
change, which will, according to the model, occur if a coalition of parties not only 
expects to be better off under alternative rules but also has the power to modify 
the currently valid rules. However, his model comprises so many potentially 
relevant determinants that an empirical test of it would be extremely difficult. 
Ticchi and Vindigni (2003) are interested in an even broader question, namely, 
the factors determining the choice between “majoritarian” and “consensual” 
constitutions (the dichotomy having been introduced by Lijphart 1999). 
“Majoritarian” constitutions are characterized not only by having a plurality rule, 
but by a number of other characteristics, inter alia, that government is dominated 
by the executive and that governments are usually one-party governments. 
“Consensual” constitutions, on the other hand, are characterized not only by 
having PR but also by the fact that the legislative and executive powers are more 
balanced and that governments are usually coalition, i.e., more-party, 
governments. Ticchi and Vindigni hypothesize that the factor driving the choice 
between majoritarian and consensual systems is the ex ante degree of income 
inequality: if it is relatively high, a majoritarian constitution is more likely, if it is 
relatively low, a consensual constitution is more likely. 
Boix (1999) shows that changes in electoral systems can be explained as the 
consequence of franchise extensions that are assumed to be exogenously given. 
However, changes in the franchise are also chosen. The question thus becomes: 
Why—and under what circumstances—does the elite (those who are able to vote 
and who also have the competence to extend the franchise) decide to extend the 
franchise to larger parts of the population, given that an extension can lead to an 
alteration of the extant electoral system? Voigt (1999, chapter 6) proposes 
thinking of constitutional change as the outcome of a bargaining game in which a 
variable number of interest groups participate. Only powerful groups will bargain 
over a constitutional contract, which is interpreted as a real contract between an 
identifiable number of parties. This notion of the contract is thus more similar to a 
private law contract than to a social contract. The bargaining power of a group is 
determined by its ability and willingness to inflict costs on others and thereby 
reduce the net social product and the resulting rents. Due to, e.g., technological 
change, the relative bargaining power of the various groups can change over time, 
which means that the number and identity of the parties that bargain over a 
constitutional contract can change over time. It further means that those groups 20 
whose relative bargaining power has increased will demand constitutional 
renegotiation. Voigt (1999, chapter 6) contains a number of examples. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) also deal with the issue of franchise extension. 
According to them, the franchise will be extended if the hitherto disenfranchised 
are able to credibly threaten a revolution if they are not granted the franchise. 
Extending the franchise is interpreted as a commitment to future redistribution 
that will prevent social unrest. 
Lizzeri and Persico (2004) propose a complementary explanation for extension of 
the franchise. Based on a case study of 19
th century Britain, they argue that the 
franchise was extended even though—contrary to Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2000)—no serious threat to the established order could be identified. In their 
model, a narrow franchise can lead to pork-barrel politics that serve only a 
minority of the elite. If a majority of the elite expects to be better off if general 
public goods are provided in higher quantity and better quality, then it might be in 
favor of an extension. The authors show that as a consequence of the three 
franchise extensions that occurred in Britain during the 19
th century, total 
government spending as a fraction of GDP remained roughly constant but the 
composition of government spending changed in the way predicted by their 
model, namely, a drop in welfare spending was accompanied by a huge increase 
in spending on what the authors call public health infrastructure, such as sewerage 
systems and filtered water, as well as paved and drained roads. 
In sum, the estimated size of the effects of differences in electoral systems on a 
number of economic variables is often very significant. It is noteworthy that 
institutional detail matters a great deal. When electoral systems are discussed, the 
electoral rule is often attributed pride of place, but the empirical results show that 
district magnitude must not be overlooked. As soon as electoral institutions are 
not assumed to be exogenously given, but are instead assumed to be the result of 
political power games, it becomes unclear whether the connection between 
electoral rules and economic outcomes is causal or primarily a correlation. It 
appears plausible that strong actors can influence both electoral institutions and 
policy choices. More research concerning the precise transmission channels is 
thus needed. 21 
3.3. Horizontal Separation of Powers 
3.3.1. Introductory Remarks 
The term “separation of powers” is inseparably linked to Montesquieu’s De 
l’esprit des loix (1748), in which he describes a functional separation between the 
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary.18 Although Montesquieu’s account is 
based on a misinterpretation of the British system, it formed the basis for 
constitutional thinking in what was to become the United States of America (see 
Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1788/1961). The term has been used with different 
connotations. Governments structured so that different branches can decide 
independently of the other branches in different areas (a rigid separation of 
powers) are very different from governments structured so that a joint decision is 
needed (a model of checks and balances).19 This latter type has been interpreted 
as a constraint on politicians for the benefit of the citizens. 
The horizontal separation of powers is a very broad area, which is why we deal 
with it in small portions. We start with the most general consequences of having 
two or three branches, instead of just one (Section 3.3.2). We then inquire into 
different forms of government, more specifically into the question of whether 
there are systematic differences between presidential and parliamentary systems. 
This is an aspect of the separation of powers because presidential systems have a 
higher degree of separation of powers than do parliamentary ones (Section 3.3.3). 
The following subsection takes a closer look at the various ways of organizing 
legislatures. More specifically, the consequences of bicameral systems are 
inquired into (Section 3.3.4). The economic consequences of the judiciary—and 
the reasons behind different ways of organizing the judiciary—were almost 
entirely neglected by economists for a long time, but this has changed during the 
last few years and Section 3.3.5 provides an overview of recent insights 
concerning this topic. 
                                                 
18  However, the idea of separation of government power finds its roots in the writings of Aristotle 
(1932, 1297b–1298a). In the modern context, it was in 17th-century England that the doctrine 
emerged for the first time as a coherent theory of the state. 
19  Brennan and Hamlin propose calling this second version “division of power,” meaning that one 
particular power can be exercised only if various agents cooperate (2000, chapters 11, 12). 22 
3.3.2. Horizontal Separation in General 
Brennan and Hamlin (1994) develop a “revisionist view” of the separation of 
powers and set out to show that the functional separation of powers can 
systematically work against the interests of the citizen-voters. They distinguish 
between a horizontal and a vertical separation of powers but use the terms 
differently than proposed here. In their delineation, horizontal means that the 
same good is supplied by more than one actor, whereas vertical refers to a value 
chain in which different actors have different functions. What Brennan and 
Hamlin call horizontal can be thought of as the states that make up a federation, 
provide similar goods, and compete for taxpaying citizens. 
To make their point, they draw on standard monopoly models. Compared to a 
monopoly, the introduction of a horizontal separation results in two (or more) 
suppliers competing for demand and thus to a duopoly (or oligopoly). The 
equilibrium price will then be below the monopoly price and consumer rent will 
subsequently increase. A vertical separation of powers also entails a division of 
the original monopoly, albeit in a different way: Now, single functions of the 
process are divided; there is, e.g., one monopolistic firm that produces a good and 
a second monopolistic firm that distributes it. The (individually) maximizing 
strategies of the vertically separated firms will at best lead to the monopoly price, 
but usually the price will be even higher and the accruing consumer rent will thus 
be lower than in the original monopoly. Brennan and Hamlin argue that the 
separation of powers doctrine as conventionally understood is equivalent to the 
functional separation of powers and will therefore not protect citizens from being 
exploited by the governing. The next logical step in the argument, albeit not made 
by Brennan and Hamlin, would be to claim that vertical separation of powers is 
the result of politicians attempting to increase their rents at the cost of citizens. 
Brennan and Hamlin further argue (ibid.) that a horizontal separation of powers 
could also have beneficial results. In order for these to occur, though, there needs 
to be an “exit”-option for citizens as well as the absence of strong externalities 
between competing states. Their argument is, indeed, revisionist; however, it has 
had only limited impact on subsequent research. Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 
(1997), e.g., argue that politicians have two possibilities for enriching themselves 
to the detriment of citizens, the first being based on the misuse of power, the 
second on exploiting information advantages. The authors show that both 
possibilities can be reduced by implementing checks and balances between the 
legislature and the executive. This was one of the first models dealing with the 
(horizontal) separation of powers. However, it falls short of the traditional notion 23 
going back to Montesquieu as it is based on two government branches only and 
does not take a third branch (the judiciary) into consideration.20
3.3.3. Form of Government: Presidential vs. Parliamentary Regimes 
The degree of separation of powers is greater in presidential than in parliamentary 
systems as the head of the executive (the president) does not depend on the 
confidence of the legislature (parliament) to survive. Persson, Roland, and 
Tabellini (1997, 2000) argue that it is easier for legislatures to collude with the 
executive in parliamentary systems, which is why they expect higher corruption 
levels and higher taxes in those systems than in presidential systems. They further 
argue that the majority (of both voters and legislators) in parliamentary systems 
can pass spending programs whose benefits are clearly targeted at themselves, 
implying that they are able to make themselves better off to the detriment of the 
minority. This is why Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000) predict that both 
taxes and government expenditures will be higher in parliamentary than in 
presidential systems. 
To test their hypotheses, PT (2003) needed to code presidential as opposed to 
parliamentary systems. If there was no vote of no confidence, they coded the 
country as presidential.21 They derive the following results. 
1. Government spending is some 6% of GDP lower in presidential compared with 
parliamentary systems.22
2. The size of the welfare state is some 2–3% lower in presidential systems. 
3. The influence of form of government on the budget deficit is rather marginal; 
the binary variable explains only a small proportion of the variation in budget 
deficits. 
4. Presidential systems seem to have lower levels of corruption. 
                                                 
20  Padovano, Sgarra, and Fiorino (2003) add the judiciary to the Persson et al. model. Their paper is 
discussed in the subsection on the judiciary below. 
21  This means that Switzerland is coded as “presidential” although it does not have a directly elected 
president, whereas France is coded as “nonpresidential” because for his or her survival, the French 
prime minister depends on a confidence vote of parliament. 
22  If a country with a proportional and parliamentary system is compared to a country with a plurality 
and presidential system, government expenditures of the latter are predicted to be some 10 percent 
of GDP lower than the former, c.p.! 24 
5. There are no significant differences in the level of government efficiency 
between the two forms of government. 
6. Presidential systems appear to be a hindrance to increased productivity, but this 
result is significant at the 10%-level only. 
These results are impressive and intriguing. Although government spending is less 
in presidential systems and they suffer less from corruption than parliamentary 
systems, parliamentary systems have an advantage over presidential systems in 
terms of productivity, if only at a low level of significance. 
This result is reinforced by Persson (2005), who asks whether changes in the form 
of government matter for the likelihood that governments will implement 
structural policies conducive to economic growth. He finds that reforms of 
parliamentary constitutional arrangements have an important growth-promoting 
effect. Introducing parliamentary democracy in a nondemocracy or in a 
presidential democracy improve structural policy such that the long-run 
productivity growth increases a stunning 50%.23
In a study replicating and extending the PT estimates, Blume et al. (2009a) pour 
some water into PT’s wine. It turns out that PT’s results are not robust, even to 
minor modifications. Increasing the number of observations from 80 to 92 makes 
the presidential dummy insignificant in explaining variation in central government 
expenditure. This is also the case as soon as a slightly different delineation of 
presidentialism is used. If the dependent variable is changed to total (instead of 
central) government expenditure, the dummy also becomes insignificant. PT’s 
estimates of the effects of form of government on “graft” are based on data from 
1997/98. If data for the period 1996 to 2004 are used instead (or the number of 
observations is increased, or a slightly different definition of presidentialism used, 
or a combination thereof), the dummy becomes insignificant. For total factor 
productivity, PT did not find the presidentialism dummy significant. Interestingly, 
if a slightly different delineation of presidentialism or estimates of total factor 
productivity for 2000 (instead of 1988) are used, presidentialism becomes 
significantly (negatively) correlated with total factor productivity. 
                                                 
23  In an offshoot, PT (2002) ask whether the form of government has any consequences on electoral 
cycles, i.e., fiscal policy over time. They find that preelection tax cuts are a universal phenomenon, 
whereas postelection adjustments, such as spending cuts and tax hikes, only occur in presidential 
systems. In the long run, parliamentary systems should, hence, suffer from higher levels of debt. 25 
Gerring and Thacker (2004) find that parliamentary systems suffer from 
significantly less corruption than do presidential ones. They argue (ibid., 314) that 
“effective accountability arises from a highly structured relationship between 
voters and political parties and from the relatively clear lines of authority 
instituted by a centralized political apparatus.” Lederman et al. (2005) also find 
that parliamentary systems suffer less from corruption than do presidential ones 
and also draw on the concept of accountability to explain why. Their argument is 
that parliamentary systems “allow for a stronger and more immediate monitoring 
of the executive by the legislature ….” They conclude that after “political 
institutions are accounted for, variables usually found to be important 
determinants of corruption … lose virtually all their relevance.” In his recent 
survey, Treisman (2007) replicates these results but finds that presidentialism 
becomes insignificant as soon as one controls for Catholicism or when a dummy 
for South America is included. 
The differences in these results clarify an important point: to date, many of the 
effects supposedly induced by constitutional rules are not very robust but 
crucially hinge upon the exact specification of the variables, the years considered, 
the control variables included, and so on. What this suggests is that further 
research needs to be as specific as possible in trying to identify possible 
transmission channels as well as needs to take into consideration the possibility 
that small differences in institutional details can have far-reaching effects. 
The economic literature on the horizontal separation of powers is still in its 
infancy and many potentially relevant aspects have yet to be studied. If one is 
interested in the ability of constitutional rules to constrain politicians, one could, 
e.g., ask whether governments display systematic differences in complying with—
or reneging upon—constitutional rules depending on the form of government or, 
in other words, whether the congruence between formal constitutional rules and 
their factual implementation is influenced by particular traits of the constitution 
itself. It could be that presidential systems suffer from a higher likelihood of 
politicians breaking with the rules of the game, even though the formal degree of 
separation is higher in these systems. 
Presidents often claim that they are the only ones who represent the people as a 
whole.
24 This might make them more audacious than, e.g., prime ministers in 
                                                 
24  De Gaulle declared in 1964 “that the indivisible authority of the State is entrusted completely to the 
president by the people who elected him, that there existed no other authority, either ministerial, 
civil, military or judiciary which has not been conferred and was not being maintained by him, and 26 
reneging upon constitutional constraints. Political parties are regularly weaker in 
presidential than in parliamentary systems,25 which might further increase the 
incentive for a president not to take constitutional rules too seriously: if parties are 
weak, the possibility of opposition against a president who reneges upon the 
constitution might be less than in systems with strong political parties. A reduced 
likelihood of opposition does, of course, make reneging upon constitutional rules 
more beneficial. There might be yet another transmission mechanism concerned 
with political parties. Brennan and Kliemt (1994) show that organizations such as 
political parties often have longer time horizons than do individual politicians: 
whereas presidents will be out of office after one or two terms (as in Mexico or 
the United States), political parties might stay in power indefinitely (like in 
Japan). If the discount rate of presidents is indeed higher than that of, say, prime 
ministers or party leaders, offenses against formal constitutional rules may appear 
more beneficial to presidents than to prime ministers. 
PT (2003) call their book The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Thus, they do 
not try to explain the emergence of different forms of government in any detail. 
Yet, they do note that differences seem to be highly correlated with geographical 
variables: for example, presidential systems are more likely to be found in Latin 
America and closer to the equator. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that settlers 
brought (good) European institutions to colonies where their mortality was low. 
Settler mortality rates could thus serve as an instrument predicting the quality of 
institutions today.26 Persson (2005) endogenizes the choice of parliamentary as 
                                                                                                                                      
finally that it was his duty to adapt the supreme domain, which is his alone, to fit in with those, the 
control of which he delegates to others” (quoted in Duverger 1980). Although this quote is certainly 
illustrative, it may not be representative of presidents. 
25  “Strong” and “weak” refers to the organizational structure of parties; they are “strong” if they have 
many paying members who are active in political office and also follow political events closely. Due 
to the organizational structure, strong political parties have the capacity to mobilize many people 
within a short period of time, which might allow them to produce focal points different from those 
the executive would prefer. Executives in an environment with strong parties are expected to be 
more likely to play by the constitutional rules than executives in an environment with weak parties. 
26  Their measure has been heavily criticized. Albouy (e.g., 2008) argues that 36 out of 64 countries are 
assigned mortality rates from other countries; these would frequently be based on mistaken or 
conflicting evidence. Also, Albouy accuses the authors of choosing data that would favor their 
hypothesis. 
 Acemoglu  et al. (e.g., 2006) have repeatedly replied to Albouy’s reproaches. They state that their 
results are robust when African data, those most heavily criticized by Albouy, are not included in 
the sample or when a maximum cap is introduced for African mortality rates. Acemoglu et al. (2005) 
confirm most of their previous mortality rates drawing on different sources. 27 
opposed to presidential regimes by using this variable as well as different periods 
of constitution-making (1921–1950 vs. 1951–1980) as exogenous variables and 
finds that settler mortality is correlated in a negative and significant way with 
parliamentary regimes.27 Constitutional birth between 1951 and 1980 is positively 
correlated with parliamentary democracy, and constitution-making between 1920 
and 1950 negatively (but insignificantly) so. 
Robinson and Torvik (2008) explicitly endogenize presidentialism. They are 
particularly intrigued by the observation that most African countries chose a 
parliamentary system for their first postcolonial constitution. By now, however, 
most African states have switched to presidential systems, regardless of the 
identity of the former colonial power. Based on a model with two groups (each 
consisting of citizens, politicians, and political leaders), they show that 
presidentialism is more attractive when the preferences of the two groups with 
regard to public goods are more polarized, when ideological differences are more 
extreme, and when the government budget is low, which Robinson and Torvik 
equate with poor societies. 
For Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004), the choice between presidential or 
parliamentary form of government plays a prominent role. They ask how much 
“unchecked power” a society should optimally delegate to its leaders, then 
proceed to ask under what conditions societies can be expected to choose that 
optimal degree of delegation, and, finally, turn to some cross-country analysis. 
They equate “insulation” with unchecked power. Drawing on the dichotomy 
between autocracy and democracy, autocrats are more insulated than 
democratically elected governments. Within democracy, presidential systems 
have a higher degree of insulation than parliamentary ones. What is the central 
driving force explaining the variation in insulation as defined here? Aghion et al. 
(ibid.) find that insulation is positively and significantly correlated with both 
ethnic and linguistic fractionalization, meaning that highly fragmented societies 
are less democratic. However, if they are democratic, they can be expected to be 
presidential rather than parliamentary. These findings are one small first step 
toward endogenizing forms of government. 
                                                 
27  In his review essay of PT (2003), Acemoglu (2005) makes clear that settler mortality (and also 
distance from the equator) are inadequate as instrumental variables for specific institutions such as 
form of government. 28 
3.3.4. The Structure of the Legislature: Bicameralism 
Presidentialism increases the separation of powers by separating the executive 
from the legislature; bicameralism does the same by dividing the legislature. 
Although bicameralism is a frequently found constitutional setting (according to 
Tsebelis and Money 1997, it can be found in approximately one-third of all 
legislatures), its economic effects remain underresearched. In their survey paper 
on bicameralism, Cutrone and McCarty (2006) note that it “has not received the 
scholarly attention that other legislative institutions have.” Similarly, Bradbury 
and Crain (2002) find that, in contrast to the 19
th century when it was subject to 
heated discussion, bicameralism “receives scant attention in modern political 
economy.” 
The differential effects of unicameral and bicameral legislatures were first 
analyzed from an economic point of view by Buchanan and Tullock (1962, 
chapter 16). In their analytical frame, that decision-rule is optimal that leads to a 
minimum of interdependence costs.28 They conjecture that in comparison with 
unicameral systems, bicameral systems have higher decision costs, and then go on 
to state that “[o]n the other hand, if the basis of representation can be made 
significantly different in the two houses, the institutions of the bicameral 
legislature may prove to be an effective means of securing a substantial reduction 
in the expected external costs of collective action without incurring as much 
added decision-making costs as a more inclusive rule would involve in a single 
house” (ibid., 235f.). The larger the majority required to reach a certain decision, 
the lower the external costs connected with that decision because the number of 
opponents is negatively correlated with the required majority. On the other hand, 
it will become increasingly difficult to reach a decision at all because the decision 
costs are positively correlated with the required majority. One possibility for 
keeping external costs down is to require a supermajority (say of 3/4 or 5/6) in the 
single-house system. Supermajorities in a single-house system and simple 
                                                 
28  Buchanan and Tullock introduce three cost categories. External costs are those costs the individual 
expects to bear as a result of the actions of others over which he or she has no direct control. 
Second, there are decision-making costs, which the individual expects to incur as a result of the 
individual’s own participation in an organized activity. These costs only include the estimated costs 
of participating in decisions when the agreement of two or more individuals is required. The sum of 
these two cost categories is the third category, costs of social interdependency, or simply interdependence 
costs. For purely private activity, these will be zero. According to Buchanan and Tullock, a rational 
individual confronted with questions of constitutional choice will opt for minimization of 
interdependence costs. 29 
majorities in a two-house system can thus be considered as alternatives. Buchanan 
and Tullock conjecture that—given identical external costs—decision costs will 
be lower in a bicameral than in a unicameral system. 
Miller and Hammond (1989) inquire into the effects of bicameralism and the 
executive veto, sometimes considered the third chamber, on stability in the sense 
of reducing the probability of cycling majorities à la Condorcet or Arrow (1951). 
They conclude that bicameralism and the executive veto increase stability. The 
stability-enhancing effect of bicameralism depends on some preference difference 
between the two chambers. Levmore (1992) changes the focus of the analysis 
somewhat when he conjectures that a bicameral system might be better than a 
corresponding qualified majority in a unicameral system at reducing the power of 
the agenda setter. Bicameral systems are often interpreted as a check against 
overly active legislatures. 
In sum, then, it is argued that bicameralism protects minorities, reduces cycling, 
and curbs the power of the agenda setter. There are conflicting hypotheses 
regarding the potential effects of bicameralism on fiscal policies. Heller (1997) 
argues that the higher number of veto players in bicameral systems leads to higher 
budget deficits. To secure the consent of an additional veto player, additional 
expenditure needs to be agreed upon, which will lead both to higher spending and 
deficits. But frequently—and following the early advances by Buchanan and 
Tullock just discussed—the exact opposite is argued. Bradbury and Crain (2002) 
focus on the composition of government spending and theorize that bicameralism 
influences the structure of the budget in a two-fold manner: on the one hand, 
spending on redistribution should be lower (minorities being protected against 
expropriation) and, on the other, spending on potentially productivity-enhancing 
public goods should be higher than in unicameral legislatures. 
Levmore (1992) argues that bicameralism should curb corruption. Diermeier and 
Myerson (1999) show that the cost of lobbying increases when it is harder to pass 
fresh legislation, which is systematically more difficult under bicameralism than 
under unicameralism. This implies that there should be less lobbying, as well as 
less rents and corruption, under bicameralism. 
Empirical evidence on the effects of bicameralism is sparse. Congleton (2003, 
2006) deserves special mention because he tries to isolate the specific effects of 
bicameralism by running simulation models. He conjectures that bicameral 
legislatures can also affect legislation if representation is unbiased, i.e., no group 
has special representation. Based on his simulation model, he finds that bicameral 
legislatures are more faithful to the median voter, at least in the long run. The 30 
model is complemented by an analysis of the effects generated when two 
countries switched from bicameralism to a single chamber (Sweden and 
Denmark). In these two cases, policy predictability indeed decreased as a 
consequence of constitutional change. It is certainly a desideratum to analyze the 
reverse case and investigate whether policy predictability would, indeed, increase. 
Bradbury and Crain (2002) construct a continuous variable (based on the degree 
of constituent heterogeneity) for bicameralism across U.S. states and find that 
higher levels of bicameralism (in terms of redistributive coalitions) reduce 
government expenditures. In their cross-country study, Bradbury and Crain (2001) 
find that government spending increases with the number of electoral districts but 
that this effect can be curbed by a second chamber. Plümper and Martin (2003) 
also find that bicameralism is highly significantly and robustly correlated with 
lower government spending. Their universe comprises 83 countries and the period 
analyzed dates from 1975 to 1997. Regarding the effects of bicameralism on 
governance indicators, Testa (2007) uses a panel of 34 democracies for the period 
1996 to 2000. She finds that bicameralism as such is not significant in explaining 
differences in corruption levels, but that if bicameralism is interacted with both 
party alignment across the two chambers as well as the polarization between the 
incumbent and the challenging party, it turns out that aligned and polarized 
chambers reduce corruption. Note, however, that this study is confined to 34 
countries and comprises only five years. 
Here, bicameralism is analyzed as one aspect of the separation of powers. An 
analysis of potential interactions between bicameralism and the form of 
government on the one hand, and federalism on the other, is an obvious starting 
point. 
3.3.5. A Forgotten Branch: The Judiciary 
The judiciary has frequently been called “the least dangerous branch” (e.g., 
Hamilton 1787/1961, Federalist Paper #78), which may be one reason it has been 
dealt with only marginally in constitutional economics. For example, in his 
treatise on “Comparative Constitutional Engineering,” Sartori (1994) deals 
extensively with electoral systems as well as with form of government, but the 
term “judiciary” does not even appear in the index. 
In regard to the separation of powers, independence of the judiciary vis-à-vis the 
other two government branches is crucial. However, early models of the 
separation of powers, as discussed above, do not contain the judiciary as an actor. 31 
Padovano, Sgarra, and Fiorino (2003) is an extension of the Persson et al. (1997) 
model that does incorporate the judiciary as a third actor. The judiciary is 
modeled as another agent that functions as a constraint on the executive or the 
legislature. They find that an independent judiciary improves accountability but 
that this is not true of an accommodating judiciary. They conjecture that the 
likelihood of the three branches colluding (with the result that accountability will 
suffer) depends on term lengths. With regard to the judiciary, they expect longer 
term lengths to lead to lower accountability—and less welfare. That the effects of 
an independent judiciary are different from those of an accommodating judiciary 
is intuitively plausible, and yet, in order to be interesting, the conditions under 
which one can expect a judiciary to be independent or accommodating need to be 
specified. Unfortunately, the authors do not deal with this issue. Likewise, their 
conjecture on term lengths is debatable: true, shorter term lengths and the option 
to be reappointed might increase accountability, but this would be accountability 
to those who have the power to reappoint, not necessarily accountability to the 
letter of the law. 
An independent judiciary can be one means of solving the dilemma of the strong 
state. On the one hand, a state strong enough to protect private property rights is 
needed; on the other, a state that is sufficiently powerful to protect private 
property rights is also sufficiently powerful to attenuate or outright ignore them. 
This situation is detrimental for all parties. Citizens who anticipate that their 
property rights might not be completely respected have fewer incentives to create 
wealth. The state, in turn, will receive a lower tax income and will have to pay 
higher interest rates as a debtor. An independent judiciary can reduce this 
dilemma: if its decisions are based on the relevant legislation and are regularly 
enforced by the other government branches despite not being in their own (short-
term) interest, aggregate investment will rise and the economy will grow more 
quickly. 
Is this theoretical conjecture supported by the data? One huge problem, of course, 
is to make the degree of independence that the judiciary enjoys in various 
countries measurable and thus comparable. Feld and Voigt (2003, 2006) introduce 
two indicators, one dealing with de jure independence (i.e., the independence of 
the courts as it can be deduced from legal documents) and the other with de facto 
independence (i.e., the degree of independence that the courts actually enjoy). 
Estimating the impact of judicial independence (JI) on economic growth, Feld and 
Voigt (2006) find that while de jure JI does not have an impact on economic 
growth, de facto JI positively influences real GDP per capita growth in a sample 
of 73 countries. 32 
Quite a few questions remain to be answered: What are the transmission channels 
though which de facto JI impacts economic growth? Is the specific organization 
of courts relevant (e.g., whether a country has a single top court, like the Supreme 
Court in the United States, or follows the Austrian model, which has a specialized 
constitutional court)? 
Given that JI has significant economic effects, we would like to know its 
determinants. Conventional wisdom has it that an independent judiciary 
constrains the other two branches of government. The other two branches would 
therefore be keen on a judiciary without teeth. Landes and Posner (1975) were the 
first to question this conventional wisdom from an economic point of view. 
According to them, the legislature is not controlled by the judiciary, but 
legislators have an interest in an “independent” judiciary because its existence 
makes it more valuable to be a legislator as it can prolong the lifespan of 
legislative deals legislators strike with representatives of interest groups. This 
prolonged legitimacy of deals increases their value to the interest groups, 
simultaneously increasing the groups’ willingness to pay the legislators. Landes 
and Posner define a judiciary as independent if it enforces “existing statutes in 
accordance with the intent of the enacting legislature” (ibid., 883) and thus 
produces stable expectations. The legislators have an interest in being able to 
make credible commitments vis-à-vis interest groups. An independent judiciary 
enables them to do this by reducing the possibilities for postcontractual 
opportunism either by themselves or by their successors. According to Landes and 
Posner, the political branches have various means of imposing costs upon the 
judiciary (“budgetary harassment, tinkering with the courts’ jurisdiction and 
altering the composition of the judiciary by the creation of many new judgeships” 
[ibid., 885]), which—in turn—can maintain its independence best by enforcing 
the “contracts” earlier legislatures struck with interest groups. 
Landes and Posner’s paper can also be interpreted as a theory on choice of JI. 
Later papers have both challenged and agreed with that view. For Ramseyer 
(1994), court independence depends on the expectations of politicians: if they 
expect their own party to remain in power, they will have less incentive to create 
an independent judiciary than if they expect to lose power to a competing party 
soon. Ginsburg (2002) can be interpreted as a broadening of Ramseyer’s 
approach: for him, politicians are likely to choose a higher degree of judicial 
review (as one important aspect of JI), the higher the degree of political 
uncertainty at the time of constitutional design. 33 
The interest group theory of JI can be criticized on various grounds. First, the 
concept of “independence” seems shaky. Landes and Posner equate JI with 
“enforcing the original intent of legislative deals,” which is supposed to result in 
predictability. However, it needs to be explained why the judiciary would enforce 
deals made by previous legislatures and not by the current one seeing as their 
salaries depend on the current legislature.29
Hanssen (2004) tests two predictions first generated by Ramseyer (1994), namely, 
that JI will be higher (i) if politicians fear losing power and (ii) the farther apart 
the ideal points of the rival parties. Using judicial retention procedures as a proxy 
for JI, he finds empirical support for these hypotheses in his analysis of panel data 
covering the U.S. states between 1950 and 1990. Besley and Payne (2003) have 
used a similar approach to explain differences in judicial behavior: they find that 
judges make decisions that favor important sectors of the electorate as this can 
increase their chances of reelection. These empirical studies deal with the United 
States; cross-country studies are clearly a desideratum. 
Hayo and Voigt (2007) is a first attempt at explaining variation in de facto JI 
across countries. They find that high levels of de jure JI, the extent of 
democratization, and higher degrees of press freedom are good predictors for high 
levels of de facto JI. 
More work is needed that inquires into the utility functions of as well as the 
(perceived) constraints on judges. It is interesting that Mueller (1996, chapter 19) 
does not think that formal institutions could be sufficient to ensure a judiciary that 
is not only independent but also accountable. For incentives to make judges 
decide impartially (ibid., 284), “one has to rely on ‘the culture of the judiciary’ 
and the great status (and possibly financial rewards) that surround it.” This 
statement gives rise to at least two implications. First, an independent and 
accountable judiciary might simply be impossible if the respective culture does 
not support it. Second, informal institutions might be an important factor in the 
actually realized level of JI. Hayo and Voigt (2007) test for a number of 
potentially relevant informal factors, such as the capacity to overcome the 
problem of collective action, religious affiliation, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 
and the level of trust found among the members of society, and find that none of 
                                                 
29  A number of scholars, mostly from the Virginia tradition of public choice, try to test the Landes 
and Posner hypothesis empirically (e.g., Crain and Tollison 1979; Anderson, Martin, Shugart II, and 
Tollison 1989; Anderson, Shugart II, and Tollison 1990); their results are summarized in Voigt 
(1997). 34 
these factors survives the rigorous model reduction process they employ. More 
research with a greater number of countries and better proxies seems warranted. 
3.4. Vertical Separation of Powers: Federalism 
We now turn to federalism, i.e., the vertical separation of powers, which is known 
in mainstream economics as “fiscal federalism.” Except for incorporating a 
second—and possibly a third—layer of government into their analyses, scholars 
working within this approach largely remain within the traditional model, i.e., 
they assume government to be efficiency maximizing. They then ask on what 
governmental level public goods will be (optimally) provided taking externalities 
explicitly into account. This approach need thus not concern us here (for surveys, 
see Inman/Rubinfeld 1997; Oates 1999, 2005).30 Further, as we are interested in 
the economic effects of constitutions, we propose to distinguish between 
federalism on the one hand and (fiscal) decentralization on the other. Federalism 
is a constitutional-level trait; decentralization describes policy choices made at the 
postconstitutional level. This implies that decentralization can also occur in 
nonfederally structured states.31
In a nutshell, the conjectured economic benefits of federalism are expected to 
arise from the competition between constituent governments (i.e., from 
noncooperation), its costs are based in the necessity of cooperating on some issues 
(i.e., from cooperation). Thus, Hayek (1939) argues that competition between 
governments will reveal information on efficient ways to provide public goods. 
Assuming that governments have incentives to make use of that information, 
government efficiency should be higher in federations, c.p. In Tiebout’s (1956) 
famous model, the lower government levels compete for taxpaying citizens, thus 
giving lower governments an incentive to cater to these citizens’ preferences. 
Turning to possible costs of federal constitutions, if the number of states is high, 
economies of scale in the provision of public goods could remain unrealized. For 
example, Tanzi (2000) suspects that those providing public goods will be 
                                                 
30 Gerring  et al. (2006, 7) make the point succinctly: “Fiscal federalism is a theory of public 
administration, not of constitutional structure.” In the language of constitutional economics, it deals 
with the optimal allocation of specific government tasks on the various government levels but all 
this at the postconstitutional stage. 
31  Blume and Voigt (2008) have collected more than two dozen indicators of both federalism and 
decentralization and use factor analysis to test whether the latent variables neatly separate between 
the two concepts. They find that more than two factors emerge. 35 
insufficiently specialized. Also, federal states need to deal with a moral hazard 
problem that is not an issue in unitary states.32 The federal government will 
regularly issue “no-bail-out clauses” but they will not always be credible.33 With 
regard to the issue of overborrowing, Wildasin (1997) argues that large states can 
become “too big to fail.” On the other hand, it has been argued (Rodden and 
Wibbels 2002) that large member states can internalize more of the benefits 
generated by responsible fiscal policies. 
A number of factors might mitigate this free rider problem: if strong, disciplined 
parties are active throughout most of the federation and one party is in charge of 
the federal as well as most of the constituent governments, then party leaders may 
be able to prevent state officials from externalizing the negative effects of 
overborrowing (Rodden and Wibbels 2002). Notice that this mitigating effect is 
comprised of institutional as well as noninstitutional aspects: the structure of the 
party system is a consequence of the heterogeneity of the country as well as of its 
electoral institutions, whereas dissimilitude between federal and constituent 
governments is result of voter choice. 
To the question of whether corruption levels will be higher under federal or 
unitary constitutions, there is one standard answer: constituent governments are 
closer to the people, play infinitely repeated games with local constituents, and 
hence are subject to local capture (see, e.g., Tanzi 2000). Therefore, corruption 
levels will be higher under federal than under unitary constitutions. The standard 
argument against the local capture hypothesis is that the behavior of constituent 
governments is more transparent in federations and politicians are, hence, more 
accountable for their actions. This would imply that corruption is lower under 
federal constitutions. Additionally, corruption can signal an inadequacy in the 
relevant rule system; under dysfunctional rules, even welfare-enhancing activities 
will often require corrupt behavior. This assumption leads to the argument that 
since the constituent units of federal states are closer to the people, it is likely that 
their rules will be more adequate than those in unitary states. 
Regarding the stability of government action, policy swings will be less 
pronounced when there are changes in the national government. This near 
                                                 
32  The relationship between the central government and the lower units in unitary states might be 
more aptly described drawing on principal-agent theory with its familiar monitoring problems. For 
such a view, see Seabright (1996). 
33  Rodden (2002, 672) points out that the creditworthiness of the federal level might be jeopardized if 
it does not bail out the constituent governments. 36 
predictability of government policy allows private actors to form expectations 
over a longer period of time, which might, in turn, increase overall productivity. 
On the other hand, the existence of a number of power centers always entails the 
possibility of power struggles and instability. This might mean that, c.p., federal 
constitutions will result in lower levels of productivity than unitary states. 
Empirical tests are necessary to resolve these contradictory theories. 
Estimating the effects of federalism presupposes the possibility that such can be 
ascertained. Depending on the specific research question, different dimensions 
might be desirable. Blume et al. (2008) collect and compare no less than 26 
different indicators for federalism and fiscal decentralization and discuss the 
various strengths and weaknesses of each. Instead of repeating that exercise here, 
we focus on just one indicator. Stegarescu (2004) proposes a new indicator that is 
not based on the expenditure shares at the central and state level, but on the 
revenue side, arguing that the autonomy in determining tax levels or even in 
introducing entirely new taxes is the single most important criterion for assessing 
the degree to which a country is factually federal. Based on the OECD Revenue 
Statistics, he shows that countries such as Austria and Germany score much worse 
with regard to decentralization in his indicator than they have in previous ones 
and reports that his indicator contradicts the common claim that federal countries 
are more decentralized than unitary ones. More generally, it is shown that 
measurement errors can lead to erroneous conclusions, particularly with regard to 
the effects of fiscal decentralization. 
Given these reservations as to commonly used indicators, what can we learn from 
existing empirical studies? For a long time, the evidence concerning the effects of 
federalism on overall government spending was mixed. Over the last several 
years, though, this appears to have changed. Rodden (2003) shows for a cross-
country study covering the period 1980 to 1993 that countries in which local and 
state governments have the competence to set the tax base total government 
expenditure is lower. Feld, Kirchgässner, and Schaltegger (2003) find that more 
intense tax competition leads to lower public revenue. 
In a number of early papers, Philip Grossman deals with the effects of fiscal 
decentralization on public sector size: following the theoretical lead of Brennan 
and Buchanan (1980), he shows that governments have an incentive to circumvent 
the pressures of competitive federalism by colluding. He hypothesizes that they 
will use intergovernmental grants toward this end. These grants, in turn, expand 
overall government size. He finds evidence in support of his thesis for the United 37 
States (Grossman 1989), Australia (Grossman 1992), and Canada (Grossman 
1994). 
Treisman (2000) finds that federal states have, c.p., higher corruption levels than 
unitary states, drawing on a dummy variable for federalism first introduced by 
Daniel Elazar. However, employing data that have become available since, he 
(2007, 235) now finds that the correlation between perceived corruption and 
federal structure is not at all robust. PT (2003, 61) find that federalism is not a 
significant variable in explaining rent extraction (which they use as a proxy for 
corruption). The evidence is thus inconclusive, warranting more fine-grained 
research. With regard to productivity, PT (2003, 71) find that the federalism 
variable is highly significant for explaining differences in both labor and total 
factor productivity, with federations having higher levels of each. 
The available evidence concerning the effects of federalism (or decentralization) 
on economic growth is just as ambiguous as the theoretical conjectures. There are 
only half a dozen studies with cross-country evidence and these are often limited 
to the OECD member states. Enikopolov and Zhuravskaya (2006) is an exception, 
with a cross-section of as many as 73 countries. They find that higher 
decentralization of revenue as such does not have a significant effect on growth, 
but that if decentralization is interacted with the age of the parties (or the 
fractionalization of government parties), things change: having older parties 
significantly improves the effect of decentralization, whereas fractionalization 
significantly worsens growth prospects. Davoodi and Zou (1998) report similar 
results based on decentralization of spending in 46 countries. Thießen (2003a, 
2003b) finds the opposite for both a cross-section of 21 developed countries and a 
panel of 26 countries. Feld et al. (2004) survey the literature in more detail, 
including empirical results for individual countries that are equally ambiguous as 
those mentioned here. 
Based on the various factors that they produce on the basis of indicators for both 
federalism and decentralization, Blume and Voigt (2008b) conclude that 
institutional detail clearly matters. They find that with regard to a number of 
dependent variables (budget deficit, government expenditures, budget 
composition, government effectiveness, and two measures of corruption), 
frequently used federalism dummies turn out to be insignificant in explaining 
variation, whereas particular aspects of federalism are significant, some of them 
very much so. 
One problem for this research strategy is the low number of observations as the 
number of federal states is rather small (some 20 countries worldwide). One 38 
possible way of circumventing this problem it to draw on case studies instead of 
econometric estimates, which is exactly what Blankart (2000) does. Blankart 
compares the development of two federally organized states over time, namely, 
Switzerland and Germany. It is often presumed that there are inherent centralizing 
tendencies even in federal states. Blankart asks whether the so-called law of the 
attracting power of the highest budget (also called Popitz’s law) is a law in the 
sense of natural sciences, or whether it is a consequence of constitutional choices. 
He conjectures that centralization is a function of the cartelization tendencies 
between federal and state government levels, which, in turn, would be a function 
of constitutional rules. He then shows that the competence of the federal level to 
appropriate tax competence from the state level is crucial for explaining 
differences in the centralizing tendencies of different federations. 
Vaubel (1996) analyzes the process of centralization in federal states empirically. 
His first result is that federal states are indeed less prone to centralization than 
states with a nonfederal constitution. Centralization is measured as the share of 
central government expenditure in total government spending. If one replaces the 
binary dummy variable for federalism by quantitative constitutional variables, the 
most powerful single explanatory variable is the age of the constitutional court 
(for the entire sample) or the independence of the constitutional court from the 
organs of central government (for the industrialized states). If one takes into 
account (a) the degree of control that the lower-level governments have over 
changing the federal constitution and (b) whether tax increases require a popular 
referendum, the explanatory power can be raised further. It thus seems that some 
constitutional provisions can make a difference in constraining centralization. 
Our knowledge concerning the conditions under which constitutional assemblies 
choose federal, rather than unitary, structures leaves much to be desired. 
Figueiredo and Weingast (2005) deal with the issue of how the institutions of 
federalism can be sustained. They introduce a two-stage game: in the first stage, 
the institutions of federalism are determined (“institutional game”); in the second 
stage, a repeated game is played in which participants can either act in accordance 
with the institutions established in the first stage or renege upon them. Figueiredo 
and Weingast (ibid.) stress the need of federal institutions to be self-enforcing; 
they show that constitutional rules can serve as a coordination device that allows 
the members of a federation to act collectively in case the center tries to exploit 
rents from one or more members. Figueiredo and Weingast demonstrate that 
sustained federalism can be an equilibrium of their game. Although they look at a 
few countries to demonstrate some of the implications of their model, their focus 
is chiefly theoretical. 39 
Still lacking, then, are empirical insights dealing with the question of under which 
conditions constitutional assemblies choose federal structures in the first place. It 
is very plausible that countries with a rather high degree of internal diversity 
along geographical lines (such as ethnic, religious, or linguistic) and that 
simultaneously need to stay intact due to external threats will be more likely to 
choose federal structures than will countries without these conditions. The 
identity of the former colonial power could also be relevant as quite a few former 
British colonies have a federal structure today (Australia, Canada, India, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, South Africa, and the United States) but very few former 
French colonies do. It is further noteworthy that—with the exception of Russia—
none of the newly passed constitutions of central and eastern Europe have a 
federal structure, which means that age of constitutions could be worth exploring. 
However, these are nothing more than ad hoc observations and the issue surely 
deserves rigorous analysis. 
3.5. The New Separation of Powers: Increasing the Number of Veto Players 
Traditionally, the separation of powers is thought of as involving three branches 
of government—legislature, executive, and judiciary. When distinguishing 
between horizontal and vertical separation of powers, vertical separation refers to 
the different layers of government, in particular federalism. A modern view of the 
separation of powers, however, could encompass even more aspects. For example, 
it could be investigated whether delegation of decision-making competence to 
independent agencies has any significant economic impact. Usually, this sort of 
delegation is thought of as domestic delegation, but in recent years, more and 
more competence has been delegated to international organizations. Monetary 
policy is a good example of both domestic and international delegation. The 
effects of independent central banks on inflation rates have been analyzed 
extensively (for surveys, see Berger, de Haan, Eijffinger 2001; Hayo and Hefeker 
2002). But monetary policy is also a good example of delegation at a level beyond 
the nation-state: the European Central Bank is only the most striking example. 
Others include currency boards and the recognition of foreign currencies as legal 
tender, as in some Latin American countries. It seems justified to analyze the 
economic effects of delegated powers within constitutional economics as at least 
some of the delegated powers are dealt with on the constitutional level.34
                                                 
34  In some nation-states, international law even trumps domestic constitutional law. 40 
Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) focus on the United States and are interested in 
identifying the issues that are subject to delegation. Voigt and Salzberger (2002) 
deal with the question of under what circumstances legislatures prefer 
international over domestic legislation if both are feasible, and derive a number of 
hypotheses in which type and extent of delegation are a function of the given 
constitutional structure. 
A first step toward making this broader concept of the separation of powers 
measurable is taken by Henisz (2000), who is concerned with the capacity of 
governments to credibly commit to their policy announcements. He constructed 
an indicator based on the idea that the higher the number of (political) actors 
whose consent is necessary to change a given policy, the less likely are 
unforeseen policy reversals. However, changes in rules and/or policies remain 
possible even when there are a great many chambers or veto players if a sufficient 
number of relevant actors have similar preferences. Henisz takes this possibility 
explicitly into account by recognizing the factual distribution of the preferences 
the relevant actors hold. This implies that his indicator contains a mixture of 
institutional and noninstitutional factors, namely, the formal separation of powers 
on the one hand, and the political majorities in the respective chambers on the 
other. Henisz finds that his indicator has a significant impact on economic growth 
both statistically and economically. Beck et al. (2000) develop a similar indicator 
(called CHECKS in their database of political institutions). The number of veto 
players has been identified as a significant determinant with regard to a number of 
dependent variables: Henisz (ibid.) himself finds it to have both a statistically and 
economically significant impact on economic growth, using various estimation 
techniques. Panizza (2001) asks whether the number of veto players (as calculated 
by Henisz) has a bearing on institutional quality (proxied for mostly by the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators) and finds the impact to be statistically 
significant, while its substantial effect is limited. Keefer and Stasavage (2003) 
argue that the number of veto players is crucial for central banks to be able to 
determine monetary policy independently from government interventions. 
3.6. Representative vs. Direct Democracy 
A broad understanding of the separation of powers could encompass direct 
democratic institutions, in which it is the citizens who act as an additional veto 
player. It has been hypothesized that direct democratic institutions make 
politicians more accountable and result in policy choices that more closely match 
citizen preferences. As with regard to federalism, it is unclear ex ante whether that 41 
should mean lower taxes, budgets, and deficits, although most of the literature 
appears to assume that this should be the case. 
In real-world societies of a size too large to efficiently vote directly on all issues, 
representative and direct democracy are complementary institutions. In these 
societies, a different degree of direct democratic institutions is combined with 
representative institutions. With regard to direct democratic institutions, 
referendums are usually distinguished from initiatives.35 The constitution can 
prescribe the use of referendums for passing certain types of legislation, in which 
case agenda-setting power remains with parliament, but citizen consent is 
required. Initiatives, in contrast, allow citizens to become agenda setters: the 
citizens propose a piece of legislation that will then be decided upon, given that 
they manage to secure a certain quorum of votes in favor of the initiative. 
Initiatives can be aimed at different levels of legislation (constitutional vs. 
ordinary legislation), and their scope can vary immensely (e.g., some constitutions 
prohibit initiatives on budget-relevant issues).36
In their paper on the effects of direct democratic institutions on total factor 
productivity in Switzerland, Feld and Savioz (1997, 515) argue that due to the 
lack of theoretically convincing transmission channels, it makes sense to look at 
the big picture, namely, to inquire whether the presence of direct democratic 
institutions leads to higher total factor productivity.37 In other papers (e.g., 
Matsusaka 2005), the principal-agent problem plays a central role. 
In a principal-agent framework, citizens are the principals and can only very 
imperfectly control their agent—the government. In this situation, direct 
democratic institutions can have two effects, namely, a direct effect, which 
enables the principals to override the decisions of an unfaithful agent, and an 
indirect effect, where simply the threat of override is sufficient to compel the 
agent to behave according to the principal’s preferences. Potentially, reducing the 
                                                 
35  We follow the convention of the literature here and talk of referendums instead of referenda. 
36  A third variant is plebiscites, which are often used by the governing to have their policies 
confirmed. Frequently, they have no binding effect, which is why they do not play an important role 
in the literature on the economic effects of direct democracy. 
37  They write: “there seems to be no simple theoretical reason how direct democracy should affect 
economic performance. It seems to be more interesting to analyze the contribution of political 
decision making mechanisms in terms of efficiency. This hints towards the composition of revenue 
and expenditure, the efficiency of the revenue system in terms of tax evasion as well as the 
efficiency of the provision of public services.” 42 
principal-agent problem by way of direct democratic institutions could affect all 
the economic variables discussed in this paper: if citizens prefer an expenditure 
level that is higher/lower than that preferred by the government, they should be 
able to achieve it via direct democratic institutions. It is often assumed that 
governments prefer higher expenditure levels than do citizens; in this case, we 
would expect expenditure levels to decrease with increasing importance of direct 
democratic institutions in the country. 
Matsusaka (1995, 2004) estimates the effects of the right to an initiative on fiscal 
policy among all U.S. states except Alaska. States with the right to an initiative 
have lower expenditures and lower revenues than states without that institution. 
With regard to Switzerland, Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) deal with the effects of 
a mandatory fiscal referendum on the same variables. They find that in cantons 
with the mandatory referendum, both expenditure and revenue are lower by about 
7 and 11 percent compared to cantons without mandatory referendums. Matsusaka 
(2004, chapter 4) also deals with the question of whether initiatives have any 
effect on the distribution of government spending between the state and the local 
level and finds that initiative states spend 13 percent less per capita at the state 
level than noninitiative states, but spend 4 percent more on the local level. 
Proponents of direct democracy would interpret this finding as evidence in favor 
of the hypothesis that under direct democracy, government spending is more in 
line with citizen preferences. Feld et al. (2008) ask whether government spending 
really is more in line with citizen preferences in a direct democracy and answer it 
by analyzing the Swiss case. Drawing on panel data for Swiss cantons for the 
years from 1980 to 1998, they find that fiscal referendums at the cantonal level 
lead to less centralization of both cantonal spending and revenue. However, 
citizen fiscal preferences are not necessarily always more conservative than those 
of their representatives: Matsusaka (2000) finds that during the first half of the 
20
th century, voters in U.S. initiative states were frequently less conservative 
fiscally than their elected representatives. Funk and Gathmann (2005) identify 
preference heterogeneity among voters in different Swiss cantons as a significant 
variable explaining differences in cantonal spending. 
The next question we are interested in is whether direct democratic institutions 
have any effect on rent extraction, i.e., the perceived level of government 
corruption as well as the efficiency with which public goods are provided. With 
regard to U.S. states, Alt and Lassen (2003) find that initiative states have 
significantly lower levels of perceived corruption than noninitiative states. 
Pommerehne (1983, 1990) deals with the effects of direct democracy on the 43 
efficiency with which government services are provided. More specifically, he 
finds that waste collection in Swiss towns having both a private contractor for the 
service and direct democratic elements is provided at lowest cost. Some of the 
cost effectiveness is lost when waste collection is provided by the town itself and 
additional efficiency losses materialize if waste collection is provided in towns 
without direct democratic elements. Blomberg et al. (2004) ask whether there is 
any significant difference in the effective provision of public capital between 
initiative and noninitiative states among the 48 continental U.S. states during the 
period 1969 to 1986. They find that noninitiative states are some 20 percent less 
effective in providing public capital than are initiative states. 
Dalton (forthcoming) looks into the possible effects of direct democracy on the 
quality of governance and asks whether the availability and the actual use of 
initiatives across U.S. states between 1960 and 1998 is significantly correlated 
with a number of proxies for good governance, such as tax policies (reflecting an 
input into government performance), government management (reflecting the 
process), and education policies (as a government output). Controlling for a 
number of standard variables, he finds that the frequent use of initiatives seems to 
impede state government performance, rather than improve it. 
Finally, do direct democratic institutions have any discernible effect on 
productivity and thus on per capita income? Feld and Savioz (1997) find that per 
capita GDP in cantons with extended democracy rights is some 5 percent higher 
than in cantons without such rights. 
Frey and co-authors argue that one should not look only at the outcomes that 
direct democratic institutions produce, but also at the political processes they 
induce (e.g., Frey and Stutzer 2006). Kirchgässner and Frey (1990) speculate that 
the readiness of voters to incur information costs would, ceteris paribus, be higher 
in democracies with direct democratic institutions because the voters participate 
more directly in the decisions (ibid., 63). 
Smith and Tolbert (2004) investigate the effects of the initiative on voting levels, 
civic engagement, and confidence in government. They compare initiative with 
noninitiative U.S. states and find that the frequent use of initiatives has positive 
effects on all three aspects. Benz and Stutzer (2004) provide evidence in favor of 
the conjecture that citizens in states with direct democratic institutions are better 
informed than citizens in purely representative states. Some European states used 
referendums to pass the Maastricht Treaty, whereas others did not. Relying on 
Eurobarometer data, Benz and Stutzer find that citizens in countries with a 
referendum were indeed better informed both objectively (i.e., knowledge about 44 
the EU) as well as subjectively (i.e., feelings about how well they were informed). 
The paper is also interesting because it is one of the very few that deals with the 
effects of direct democratic institutions in a cross-country setting. 
Based on micro data controlling for a host of relevant variables such as 
occupational status, marital status, health conditions, and so forth, Frey and 
Stutzer (2000) find that Swiss citizens who live in cantons with a high degree of 
direct democracy are happier. Lascher and Wassmer (2007) quarrel both with the 
logic underlying the conjecture that broader direct democratic rights could be 
conducive to happiness and with the empirical evidence. Using data from the 
General Social Survey for the U.S. states and controlling for variables significant 
in previous studies, they conclude that in none of their models do the direct 
democracy proxies approach statistical significance. 
Blume  et al. (2009) is the first cross-country study to analyze the economic 
effects of direct democracy and their findings only partially confirm previous 
results. They do find a significant influence of direct democratic institutions on 
fiscal policy variables and government efficiency, but no significant correlation 
between direct democratic institutions and productivity or happiness. Institutional 
detail matters a great deal: while mandatory referendums appear to constrain 
government spending, initiatives seem to increase it. The actual use of direct 
democratic institutions often has more significant effects than their potential use, 
implying that—contrary to what economists would expect—the direct effect of 
direct democratic institutions is more relevant than its indirect effect. It is also 
noteworthy that the effects are usually stronger in countries with weaker 
democracies. 
To my knowledge, there have been no systematic attempts at explaining the 
emergence of direct democratic institutions.38 Lijphart (1984, 206) even admitted 
“defeat in the search for general propositions and theories” with regard to the 
presence or absence of a referendum right. This was a quarter-century ago and it 
seems highly desirable to make another attempt at endogenizing direct democratic 
constitutional rules. 
                                                 
38  See also Matsusaka (2005, 197), who writes: “A difficulty in developing instruments is that we do 
not yet understand why certain states adopted the process and others did not.” 45 
3.7. Basic Rights 
Many constitutions contain an elaborate catalogue of basic rights, which are often 
separated into positive or negative rights. Negative rights can further be 
delineated into rights establishing freedom from state or third-party interference 
(such as torture, imprisonment without trial, etc.) and freedom to do something 
(assemble with others, criticize the government in public, etc.). Examples of 
positive rights are rights to food, housing, paid jobs, and so forth. Negative rights 
create a protected domain that not even the state is allowed to trespass. For 
democratically organized states, this implies that negative rights limit the possible 
scope of majority decision making: if rights are really basic, even large majorities 
are bound by them and cannot simply ignore them. Negative rights can thus 
protect minorities against current majorities and can be thought of as “veto 
rights,” as they give their holders the right to behave in a certain way, even if a 
huge majority would like the right holders to behave differently. 
When it comes to basic rights, the congruence between formally granted rights 
and their actual enforcement is especially crucial. It is even plausible to assume 
that the degree of factual enforcement is a function of other constitutional 
characteristics. For example, a greater degree of separation of powers—be it 
horizontal, vertical, new, or a combination thereof—would appear conducive to a 
high degree of factual enforcement. In the literature, basic rights are usually 
sorted into three categories: (1) economic rights, which include primarily private 
property rights broadly defined; (2) civil and political rights, which include 
unrestricted travel, the possibility of participating in political life, freedom from 
government censorship, and so forth, although it is not uncommon for political 
rights to be explicitly separated from civil rights; and (3) social or emancipatory 
rights, which endow the individual with positive rights vis-à-vis the state.39 
Blume and Voigt (2007) propose a fourth category, namely, basic human rights, 
which includes the absence of torture, the absence of political killings, the 
absence of people who disappear, etc. 
Economists have traditionally argued that secure property rights (i.e., economic 
rights) lead to higher income levels and that social and emancipatory rights have 
just the opposite effect. It has been pointed out that the two types of rights are in 
competition as any—factually enforced—promise of the state as to positive social 
                                                 
39  Often, these rights are also called “economic, social, and cultural rights” as in the International 
Covenant. We prefer to refer to them as social or emancipatory rights here as economic rights will 
be used in a different context and will indicate primarily the security of private property rights. 46 
rights must be paid for by someone (see, e.g., Hayek 1976). With regard to civil 
rights, their positive potential to constrain government is often discussed. A free 
press, for example, provides a safe way of criticizing government behavior (e.g., 
Sen 1999). On the other hand, many economists are skeptical that democracy (the 
most important aspect of political rights) is conducive to income and growth (e.g., 
Barro 2000; see also Section 3.10 below). Further complicating the issue is that 
the economic effects of basic human rights have rarely been systematically 
analyzed. Blume and Voigt (2007) argue that talk of various kinds of human 
rights makes little sense in the absence of basic rights. For example, discussing 
the effects of secure economic rights is inane if persons can be imprisoned 
without a fair trial, tortured into pleading guilty, and further so abused that the 
existence of “rights” is a hypocrisy of the first level. 
Farber (2002) argues that a government’s respect for basic human rights is a good 
indicator of how seriously that same government will take its promises as to other 
rights, such as property rights. If government does not refrain from discrimination 
and physical harm vis-à-vis its citizens, why should it respect private property 
rights of foreign investors? If government respect for basic human rights is indeed 
a signal of its credibility in general, the abuse of basic human rights should have 
consequences for (i) the country’s creditworthiness as well as (ii) the amount of 
foreign direct investment it will attract. Additionally, (iii) the general propensity 
to invest should be lower in an abusive country than in one where the government 
respects basic human rights. 
There is a sizable literature inquiring into whether economic rights have a 
significant effect on economic growth, Knack and Keefer (1995) being a 
pathbreaker on this topic. Their paper, for the first time, uses data from the 
International Country Risk Guide and Business Environment Risk Intelligence as 
proxies for the security of property rights and finds that the security of these rights 
is significant for explaining both investment and growth. Around the same time, 
the Economic Freedom Index first appeared (Gwartney, Lawson, and Block 
1996), as did the Index of Economic Freedom, which was produced jointly by the 
Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal. These data sets gave rise to an 
entire cottage industry focusing on the interrelations between various aspects of 
economic freedom and prosperity. 
This literature is extremely interesting but only marginally relevant for this survey 
because the explanatory variables found therein often have only a very indirect 47 
basis in the constitution.40 Sometimes, the variables are not even proxying for 
institutions, but simply for policies. Moreover, they are often subjective 
indicators. Thus, the impact on economic growth of rights that are not only 
                                                 
40  It would, however, be very interesting to see whether specific constitutional rules are more (or less) 
conducive to economic freedom. Spindler and de Vanssay (2002) is a first attempt in this direction. 
They find that a higher number of veto players is correlated with higher levels of economic 
freedom. 
  The homepage of the Fraser Institute, which administers the Economic Freedom Index (EFI), 
contains a section that lists all the academic papers that rely on the data of the Index (see 
http://www.freetheworld.com/papers.html). Scully (2001) is an early survey that discusses some 
econometric issues, but relies primarily on indicators antedating the EFI. Berggren (2003) is a very 
accessible survey. De Haan and Sturm (2000) find that changes toward greater economic freedom 
do indeed foster economic growth, but that the level of freedom is not related to growth. A number 
of empirical studies dealing with the relationship between economic freedom and growth have 
analyzed the impact of the single components that make up the EFI based on the assumption that 
different variables might have different impacts on growth rates. Carlsson and Lundström (2002), 
e.g., test the sensitivity of the components They find that four components are positively related to 
growth: (i) the use of markets, (ii) the freedom to use alternative currencies, (iii) the legal structure 
and security of private ownership, and (iv) the freedom to exchange in capital markets. Of these, 
only (iii) unequivocally survives the robustness test but (ii) almost does. Monetary policy and price 
stability are insignificant, whereas increased freedom to trade with foreigners actually decreases 
growth rates. This finding is not only significant but also robust. Further, lower levels of 
government consumption and transfers decrease growth rates below a certain threshold. In other 
words, increasing government consumption can increase growth up to a certain level. Past that 
point, however, growth rates will decrease. 
  The result that increased freedom of trade is detrimental to growth is counterintuitive and has 
provoked further analysis. Berggren and Jordahl (2005) decompose this subindicator into its single 
components and find that the result is driven by a single variable, namely, “taxes on international 
trade.” Analyzing the sensitivity of this result with regard to both model specification and sample 
composition, they find that it is not robust. In fact, they find that when outliers are ignored, the 
entire subindicator exerts a positive influence on growth. More recently, Justesen (2008) uses 
Granger causality analysis to discuss whether economic freedom causes growth. Apart from the 
composite EFI, only two of its components—government size and regulatory policies—have a 
robust effect on both economic growth and investment. 
  There is no consensus as to the effects of political and civil rights on economic outcomes. Barro 
(1997, 2000) finds that the degree of democracy has little significance for explaining the variation in 
growth rates. Blume and Voigt (2007) find that social or emancipatory rights are not conducive to 
investment in physical capital but are correlated with higher levels of productivity and basic human 
rights, which, in turn, have a positive effect on investment, but do not seem to contribute to 
productivity. None of the four groups of rights ever has a significant negative effect on any of the 
economic variables included here. 48 
guaranteed by the constitution but also actually enforced is yet to be conclusively 
determined.41 In an early paper, de Vanssay and Spindler (1994) conclude that the 
entrenchment of any single right in the constitution seldom has any significant 
economic effect on growth. 
Two follow-up questions suggest themselves. (1) What about the effects of 
constitutional entrenchment on other variables, such as government spending or 
corruption? After all, a long list of positive rights means that resources will be 
needed for their implementation. This should be reflected in the structure of the 
budget and—most likely—also in the overall level of government spending. (2) 
What factors determine whether constitutionally guaranteed rights will be 
factually enforced? 
3.8. The Relevance of Procedural Rules 
3.8.1. Introductory Remarks 
The previous subsections were chiefly concerned with the economic effects of 
specific constitutional arrangements, which were assumed to be exogenously 
given, and it was noted that we have very little knowledge as to how the choice of 
arrangement is made. However, we do know that constitutional rules change over 
time and explaining their change is one of the foremost tasks of constitutional 
economics. Therefore, the literature that deals with the procedural rules used to 
choose and to change constitutional rules is briefly surveyed in this section. More 
specifically, this subsection deals with two situations in which procedural rules 
could be relevant: (1) the procedures used to choose constitutional rules and (2) 
the procedures used to amend the constitution. 
3.8.2. Procedural Rules for the Choice of Rules 
Procedural rules will never, alone, determine a constitutional arrangement. But 
assuming given preferences, the question here is what influence the procedures 
have on the rules actually chosen. Jon Elster focuses on precisely these issues. In 
his Storrs-lectures, he compares the use of rational discourse as opposed to 
bargaining strategies in the constitutional conventions that led to the U.S. 
                                                 
41  In a recent paper, Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2007) note that they did not find a robust effect of the 
degree of social rights as postulated in a country’s constitution on public policy. 49 
Constitution as well as to the first constitution of Nouveau Régime France. He is 
not terribly interested in what happened during those conventions, but in how and, 
to some extent, why it did (1991, 80; 1993, 194). 
Concerning procedures, Elster asks about the consequences of time-limits for 
constitutional conventions, about how a constitutional convention that is 
simultaneously serving as the legislature allocates its time between the two 
functions, about the impact on constitutional negotiations of regularly informing 
the public of their progress, 42 and about how certain supermajorities and election 
rules can determine the outcome of conventions (1991, 30). Riker (`1983, 1984) is 
another major influence in this field. Riker calls for an extension of traditional 
rational choice theory, pointing to the fact that in its traditional form it is 
incapable of taking into account the dynamic and creative processes that structure 
the decision room of the actors. He diagnoses a deficit in the analysis of processes 
concerning creative adjustments, which he labels heresthetics or the art of 
political strategy (1984, 2). By using rhetoric, one tries to convince others by 
argument. By using heresthetics, one tries to structure the situation in such a way 
that others will readily accept it (ibid., 8). He names several categories of 
heresthetics: strategic voting (the avoidance of “wasted” votes, the creation of a 
voting cycle, vote-trading) and agenda manipulation (arranging the sequence of 
decisions in a certain manner, introducing new voting alternatives) (1983, 63f.).43
Elster (1993, 174) deplores the fact that there is not one single paper that 
describes the process of constitution making from a general perspective. There is, 
however, a large number of case studies, of which the volume edited by Goldwin 
and Kaufman (1988) is perhaps the most comprehensive: within a framework of 
questions developed by the editors, participants in the constitution making-
process of nine countries share their experience.44 However, by and large, neither 
                                                 
42  On the question of whether there is a systematic relationship between public sessions of the 
constitutional convention and the rules agreed upon, Macey (1986) advances the hypothesis that 
public deliberations make the obvious use of log-rolling and horse-trading less likely. In this setting, 
the representatives would at least try to formulate their arguments in terms of the common good. 
43  Ulysses, who has himself bound against the mast, is the paradigmatic metaphor of constitutional 
political economy. In a sense, constitutions are an attempt to deal with societies’ almost inherent 
inability to take the long-term view, much less act on it. 
44  Voigt and Wagener (2002) contains some first-hand descriptions of constitution-making processes 
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the Elster nor the Riker program has really caught the attention of constitutional 
economics, possibly because of huge methodological problems.45
3.8.3. Procedural Rules for Changing Rules 
My earlier survey of positive constitutional economics (Voigt 1997) proposed a 
taxonomy for constitutional change based on two dimensions, namely, the legality 
of constitutional change and its formality. Regarding the first dimension, 
constitutional change can occur within the amendment rules—and thus be legal—
or it can ignore the rules – and thus be illegal. Regarding the second dimension, 
explicit change occurs when the text of the constitution is modified; implicit 
change occurs over time as the interpretation of the constitution evolves. The 
taxonomy can thus be put into a simple matrix: 
Table 2: Conceptualizing Constitutional Change 
                  Legality 
Formality 
Legal (constitutional)  Illegal (unconstitutional) 
explicit 1  3 
implicit 2  4 
 
Voigt (1997) surveys the literature connected with each of the four cells. Rasch 
and Congleton (2006) pick up that taxonomy and deal exclusively with the first 
cell. They note that almost all constitutions specify procedures for their 
amendment. A straightforward hypothesis is that the more stringent the amending 
procedures, the fewer (explicit) constitutional changes will occur. Lutz (1994) 
appears to confirm this hypothesis. Ferejohn (1997) disaggregates Lutz’s 
“difficulty-of-ratification index” and finds that the requirement of special 
majorities or separate majorities in different organs of government are key to 
explaining amendment rates. Rasch and Congleton (ibid.) now use the number of 
veto players relevant for bringing about constitutional change as an alternative 
indicator and find that this number has systematic effects on the amendment rates 
in 19 OECD countries. The authors themselves point out their amendment counts 
might be counting “both apples and oranges”: minor amendments and major 
changes are all counted in an identical fashion. 
                                                 
45  Voigt (2004) contains a more detailed and constructive critique of Elster’s program. Carey (2009) 
and Widner (2007) also emphasize the huge difficulties in dealing with these questions. 51 
A desideratum concerning future research is to deal with the question of whether 
more stringent amendment rules lead not only to less legal and explicit 
constitutional change, but also to more implicit and/or illegal constitutional 
change (i.e., change depicted by Cells 2 through 4 in the matrix). If it costs little 
to change the constitution, many such changes are to be expected, which will 
impact the uncertainty-reducing function of the constitution. On the other hand, if 
legal and explicit change is expensive, it seems more likely that constitutional 
rules will be ignored altogether, also leading to a low degree of predictability. It 
thus seems that there is a real tradeoff between rigidity and flexibility. Whether 
the conjectured relationship really exists remains to be tested empirically. 
3.9. Democracy vs. Autocracy 
To this point, we have primarily focused on the economic effects of single 
constitutional rules. For the most part, we have implicitly assumed democracy to 
prevail and have noted the great institutional variety that “democracy” allows. But 
during the history of mankind, democracy has been the exception rather than the 
rule. We thus want to take another step and look at studies that have compared the 
economic effects of democracies with those achieved in autocracies. Much 
institutional detail is thus explicitly discarded and the focus is on this simple 
dichotomy. 
The first question to ask is: What meaning does the term “constitution” have in 
autocracies? Scholars working within constitutional political economy make a 
conceptual distinction between the choice of rules and the choice within rules. At 
least implicitly, it is assumed that it is different organs and/or majority 
requirements that are characteristic of the two different levels. In autocracies, this 
distinction is more likely to be blurred than in democracies. 
We know very little about the economic effects of autocracy, about the 
mechanisms that lead to transitions toward democracy, or about the transition 
from democracy to autocracy. However, during the last 10 years, a number of 
papers dealing with some of these issues have appeared. The third edition of 
Dennis Mueller’s survey of public choice (2003) contains, for the first time, an 
entire chapter on dictatorship. For a long time, Gordon Tullock (1974, 1987) was 
the only economist seriously concerned with an economic theory of autocracy. 
His two monographs contain a very interesting collection of theoretical ideas and 
empirical examples, but lack a systematic theoretical basis. 52 
Is there any reason to expect autocracies to perform systematically differently 
than democracies? McGuire and Olson (1996) distinguish between “roving” and 
“stationary bandits” and compare the incentives of both with democracy. Roving 
bandits plunder area after area. If the likelihood of being plagued by roving 
bandits is high, incentives to invest in the production of goods that could be stolen 
is low. Stationary bandits, by contrast, settle in one area and live off that area’s 
population. Their incentives are thus entirely different from those of roving 
bandits as they have an interest in protecting “their” area against other bandits in 
order to increase the population’s incentive to be productive. Utility levels are 
higher under stationary than under roving bandits. Yet, McGuire and Olson (ibid.) 
show that expected utility is higher still under democracy: any additional unit of 
public goods provided is costly for the stationary bandit and it can be shown that 
democracy using a unanimity rule would lead to both a higher level of public 
goods provision as well as a higher level of income. But all real-world 
democracies rely on some majority rule that opens up the possibility of 
redistribution. Although McGuire and Olson argue that democracies should 
perform better, their theoretical results are heavily dependent on specific 
assumptions concerning decision rules in effect. 
Other arguments for a democracy having a systematic advantage over an 
autocracy in terms of growth prospects include its insurance function, by which is 
meant that the citizens are endowed with the ability to peacefully remove a bad 
ruler, thus making it more likely that there will be a certain degree of political 
stability, which would, in turn, increase aggregate investment. 
Barro (1997, 2000) argues that the rule of law and secure property rights are 
conducive to economic growth but that the effects of higher levels of democracy 
are uncertain: pressure to redistribute could compromise property rights and thus 
reduce the incentive to work hard and invest. He does acknowledge that 
redistribution can increase stability by making it less attractive to engage in 
criminal activity, riots, or revolutions, but he argues that even autocrats would be 
motivated to spend enough on redistribution to prevent such activities. The 
difference between democracies and autocracies would be that democracies spend 
too much on redistribution. 
A simple comparison between democracy and autocracy might be too coarse. 
Much of this survey has dealt with institutional variation within democracies, so 
variation within autocracies might also be noteworthy. Ronald Wintrobe (1990, 
1998) deals with different kinds of autocrats and proposes a taxonomy that 
distinguishes between four “ideal types.” According to his model, dictators 53 
generally have at their disposal two instruments for reaching their goals, namely, 
repression and loyalty. Whereas totalitarians derive utility from power as such and 
thus try to maximize it, tinpots choose the level of power that secures them in 
office. They are more interested in “palaces, Mercedes-Benzes, [and] Swiss bank 
accounts” (1990, 849).46 Wintrobe is now interested in the differential effects of 
economic growth on the behavior of tinpots and totalitarians. By assumption, 
tinpots are interested in only that degree of power that allows them to remain in 
power. Power is “produced” by the “inputs” of repression and loyalty. If 
economic growth increases, subjects will be more loyal to the autocrat, and less 
repression is needed to secure the minimum amount of power necessary. 
Inversely, less growth leads to more repression in tinpot regimes because less 
loyalty is substituted with more repression. Totalitarians enjoy power as such and 
thus seek to maximize it. If economic growth increases, subjects will “supply” 
more loyalty, which enables the totalitarian to be even more repressive. Again, the 
opposite also holds: if economic growth declines, the totalitarian will reduce the 
level of repression. 
Although Wintrobe’s model is an important step toward a more theoretical 
foundation of the economic theory of autocracy, attributing different preference 
functions to different types of dictators is problematic as long as the model does 
not provide for the conditions under which a particular type will make it to power. 
The  ex post facto evaluation of a certain dictator as belonging to one of the 
categories does not seem especially helpful. 
Despite this problem of the taxonomy, Islam and Winer (2004) try to test 
Wintrobe’s theory. They are interested in the differential effects of economic 
growth (both positive and negative) on the repression levels engaged in by tinpots 
and totalitarians. To do so, they first need to define criteria for separating tinpots 
from totalitarians. They do this by coding the worst-ranked countries of the Gastil 
indices, which are intended to proxy for civil and political freedoms, as 
totalitarian, the best ranked as democratic, and those in the middle as tinpots. 
According to the authors (2004, 315), the theory is “partially confirmed”: positive 
growth under totalitarians does indeed lead to more repression, whereas negative 
growth has either a positive impact or no effect on freedom (depending on the 
concrete estimation equation). With regard to tinpots, Islam and Winer (ibid.) find 
evidence that negative growth reduces freedom, which is in line with Wintrobe’s 
predictions. 
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Plümper and Martin (2003) take the inverted u-shape relation between the level of 
democracy and economic performance found by Barro (1997) as their point of 
departure. They are interested in identifying possible transmission mechanisms. 
They basically argue that initial increases in the level of democracy lead 
governments to spend less on rents and more on public goods, which induces 
additional growth. When democracy levels further increase, however, 
governments tend to overinvest in public goods and growth rates begin to fall. 
Plümper and Martin find empirical support for their model. 
Let us now return to the central question of this section and ask whether there are 
systematic differences between democracies and autocracies regarding our 
explananda. Przeworski and Limongi (1993) collected 18 studies on this issue, 
discovering 21 different results (some studies thus contained more than one 
result). Eight results indicate that democratic regimes grow faster, eight of them 
find the exact opposite, and the remaining five cannot find a significant difference 
in growth rates. Discussing some of the methodological problems of the studies, 
Przeworski and Limongi (1993, 64) conclude: “The simple answer to the question 
with which we began is that we do not know whether democracy fosters or 
hinders economic growth. All we can offer at this moment are some educated 
guesses.” Przeworski and Limongi (1993) published their survey over a decade 
ago and since then quite a few additional studies have been published but the 
empirical literature remains inconclusive. For example, in their meta-analysis, 
Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008, 62) analyze 483 regression estimates from 
84 studies: 15 percent of the estimates are negative and significant, another 21 
percent are negative but insignificant, 37 percent are positive and insignificant, 
and 27 percent are both positive and statistically significant. 
It would obviously be futile to attempt a complete survey of the results here; 
however, these inconclusive results have led to a search for advanced or 
innovative approaches to the problem. Some of the papers proposing novel 
approaches are briefly mentioned here. De Haan (2007) does not present any new 
estimates but has some suggestions for how estimates should be run. He would 
like to see more extreme bounds analyses and suggests that outliers as well as 
sample heterogeneity should be dealt with by robust regression techniques (he 
recommends least trimmed squares). Frequently, there is more than one measure 
for a certain concept (in this case democracy) and the partial correlation between 
the measures is often low. In such cases, de Haan opts in favor of factor analysis 
to identify the variation common to all measures. We now discuss several studies 
employing unusual methods to reach more conclusive results. 55 
Roll and Talbott (2001) find that democracy (or, more precisely, the political 
rights indicator as published by Freedom House, which focuses on the procedural 
aspects of democracy) as well as civil rights and freedom of the press are 
conducive to higher income. But in all studies interested in estimating the effects 
of institutions, the direction of causality constitutes a serious problem: Is income 
high because the country is democratic or is the country democratic because 
income is high? Usually, instrumental variables are used to control for 
endogeneity. Roll and Talbott (2001) choose a different path: they draw on 
singular events that made countries either substantially more or less democratic 
(“democratic event” vs. “anti-democratic event”). They find that democratic 
events are, on average, followed by a dramatic improvement in country income, 
whereas anti-democratic events typically lead to substantial reductions. 
Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) estimate a system of simultaneous equations that 
enables them to identify the specific transmission channels through which 
democracy affects growth. They find that democracy is conducive to growth by 
improving the accumulation of human capital and, but less robustly so, by 
lowering income inequality. However, democracy hinders growth by reducing the 
rate of physical capital accumulation and, again less robustly, by increasing 
government consumption. 
The difference-in-difference approach is used in a number of studies (e.g., PT 
2006). PT (2007) combine the difference-in-difference approach with matching 
estimates based on propensity scores. They conclude that previous estimates 
might have underestimated the growth effects of democracy. They find that 
transitions from autocracy to democracy are associated with an average growth 
acceleration of about 1 percentage point, whereas the transition in the opposite 
direction slows growth down by almost 2 percentage points.47 Finally, the meta-
analysis by Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008) concludes that democracy does 
not have a direct effect on growth but does have significant and robust indirect 
effects through higher human capital, lower inflation, higher political stability, 
and higher levels of economic freedom. 
Mulligan et al. (2004) ask whether democracies differ from nondemocracies in 
public policies. Looking at the decades from 1960 to 1990, they find that 
economic and social policies do not significantly differ between these two 
                                                 
47  They classify countries as democratic if they have polity2 values larger than 0. This means that 
transitions from autocracy to democracy (and vice versa) could take place without any change in a 
country’s formal constitution. 56 
regimes. They look at various taxes and find that democracies tend to have less 
redistributive personal income taxes. This is a surprising result as conventional 
wisdom has it that democracies are prone to redistribution because a poor 
majority can agree to exploit a wealthy minority. However, the more significant 
differences between the two regimes involve barriers to entering the political 
system. Autocracies are more likely to torture, execute, regulate religion, censor 
the press, and have a large military budget. 
The core issue of positive constitutional economics is to explain constitutional 
choices and thus the relevant question is under what circumstances will 
democracy be chosen and when is autocracy more likely. Therefore, it is relevant 
to explain transitions from one kind of regime to the other. Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2001) explain transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes 
and vice versa by the initial degree of inequality observed in a society. In their 
model, the function of democracy is limited to redistribution; it is the median 
voter who determines the tax rate, and the tax revenues are exclusively used for 
redistributive purposes. Revolutions (attempts to establish democratic regimes) 
and coups (attempts to establish nondemocratic regimes) are caused by changes in 
opportunity costs, i.e., by recessions that are exogenous to their model. In times of 
economic crises, the opportunity cost of threatening a revolution might be low. A 
nondemocratic government might try to prevent revolutions by broadening the 
franchise and thereby shifting the median voter toward the poor. However, too 
much redistribution makes undertaking a coup more attractive to the rich.48
Sutter (1995) assumes that a transition from authoritarian to nonauthoritarian 
government is potentially welfare increasing. Since revolutions waste resources, 
other transition paths, such as negotiated pacts, are superior. Sutter is now 
interested in the problems of implementing negotiated pacts. What he calls the 
“punishment dilemma” is caused by the inability of some actors to credibly 
commit themselves, in this case, new rulers promising not to sanction the old 
rulers in the future. An interesting insight of his work is that the optimal policy 
toward dictators is time-inconsistent: to prevent would-be dictators from 
                                                 
48  An important debate on causality was started by Lipset in 1959. He argued that high levels of 
income would enable countries to implement high-quality institutions (in particular democracy). His 
argument has recently been endorsed by Glaeser et al. (2004). Acemoglu et al. (2007) show that the 
evidence in favor of the so-called modernization hypothesis completely vanishes if country fixed 
effects proxying for historical influences are taken into account. Gundlach and Paldam (2008), on 
the other hand, argue that present international income differences have roots in the prehistoric 
past and find a large long-run causal effect of income on the degree of democracy. 57 
becoming dictators, one wants to threaten them with the worst possible 
punishment. As soon as they are dictators and one is interested in getting rid of 
them, one wants to punish them only mildly in order to give them an incentive to 
step down and let a nonauthoritarian government take over.49
Barzel (1997, 2000) discusses the role of parliament as a device autocrats can use 
to credibly bind themselves, and argues that secure kings deliberately give up 
some powers, which enables them to credibly commit themselves to promises not 
to confiscate their subjects’ property, which in turn makes possible the realization 
of additional gains from cooperation. His approach thus flatly contradicts the 
more conventional one that conceptualizes the emergence of parliament as the 
consequence of weak autocrats. 
The founders of public choice originated mostly from the United States so it is 
small wonder that they were primarily concerned with explaining the functioning 
of democracy. Today, we know something about the functioning of democracy, 
less about the functioning of autocracy, and even less about the transition from 
autocracy to democracy. To increase our knowledge, it may be necessary to 
abandon the simple dichotomy between democracy and autocracy. Our knowledge 
concerning the factors that determine the choice of regime remains very limited. 
3.10. Summary 
In sum, quite a few constitutional rules appear to have important economic 
consequences, including electoral rules (proportional vs. majority rule), form of 
government (presidential vs. parliamentary), and whether a country has a federal 
structure or direct democratic institutions. These results clearly indicate that 
endogenizing these institutions is desirable. Yet, it has been argued (Acemoglu 
2005) that these results might merely be strong correlations rather than causal 
effects. It might be (omitted) third variables that determine both institutions and 
policies. However, even if this argument is correct, it is still necessary to identify 
the conditions that give rise to different institutions as doing so will also clarify 
whether these initial conditions have a direct impact on policies. 
                                                 
49  This insight has immediate implications for the International Criminal Court, which Sutter deals 
with in a later paper (2006). 58 
4. Options for Future Development 
Constitutional political economy has come a long way since the Calculus of 
Consent. Over the last couple of years, the positive branch has made remarkable 
progress thanks to the availability of sizable data sets and the development of a 
host of indicators built thereon. This has made it possible to subject constitutional 
issues to econometric analyses that would have been impossible just a few years 
ago. Some scholars report very strong economic effects of constitutional rules; 
however, upon closer examination, many of these effects are not as robust as 
initially assumed. It has become evident that with regard to a number of 
constitutional rules, institutional detail matters a great deal. Therefore, in the years 
to come, explicit recognition of institutional details should be high on the agenda. 
Many consider describing and explaining the choice of constitutional rules as the 
core task of constitutional political economy. If this course can be agreed upon, 
there is much work to be done as very few studies endogenizing single 
constitutional rules or even entire constitutions have been conducted. It may be 
suspected that endogenizing constitutions is a nearly impossible task. 
Constitutions are written under very special circumstances that do not lend 
themselves to generalization.50 Furthermore, although constitutions are rewritten 
far more frequently than often assumed, the overall number of observations is still 
small. In my first survey of positive constitutional economics, I predicted that 
laboratory experiments would become one of the standard tools of constitutional 
economics because the choice of rules could be mimicked in the laboratory under 
exactly controllable circumstances. Today, experimental economics is a highly 
successful branch (witness the Nobel prizes awarded to Kahneman and Smith in 
2002), but it certainly has not made an inroad into constitutional political 
economy, possibly because the experiments that are carried out appear too far 
removed from any real-world constitutional choice process and their external 
validity is hence doubtful.51
                                                 
50  See Hume’s essay “Of the Original Contract” (1777, 1987, 474): “and were one to choose a period 
of time, when the people’s consent was the least regarded in public transactions, it would be 
precisely on the establishment of a new government. In a settled constitution, their inclinations are 
often consulted; but during the fury of revolutions, conquests, and public convulsions, military 
force or political craft usually decides the controversy.” 
51  Several other papers can be viewed as contributions to constitutional economics, most of which 
deal with public good games experiments that include a sanctioning mechanism (which is the 
institution). Fehr and Gächter (2000), the initial paper, led to a number of follow up papers. In 
Sutter et al. (2008), subjects decide before the first round of the game under what institutions they 59 
The recent progress in positive constitutional economics has been achieved 
primarily by drawing on cross-country studies. In Section 3.9, we saw that a 
discussion concerning the most adequate tools for cross-country analysis is taking 
place: factor as well as meta-analysis and semi-parametric tools have been 
discovered only recently by constitutional economists. It appears likely that some 
of these approaches will also be applied to some of the single constitutional rules 
described in subsections of Section 3 of this survey. 
Recently, cross-country studies as such have come under attack. The main 
methodological concerns seem to be simultaneity, reverse causality, and omitted 
variable bias. But behind these technical concerns hides the implicit—and 
problematic—assumption that one model is sufficient to “explain” various 
developments in vastly different environments and development stages (see 
Rodrik’s (2008) recent plea for second-best institutions). Ever more frequently, 
scholars seem to recommend case studies and yet there are no commonly agreed 
upon criteria for judging their quality. Whether case studies on constitution 
making can lead to general insights remains to be seen. 
Academic papers often conclude with the policy implications of their results but 
in the case of this paper, it is questionable whether policy advice, sound or 
otherwise, can even be derived from the many and various results discussed in 
Section 3. I believe we should be extremely careful in jumping to conclusions. 
The effects of many constitutional rules were estimated in isolation, but in the real 
world, effects will be the result of many interactions. It is, e.g., questionable 
whether government spending really would decrease by 10 percent of GDP if 
parliamentary PR systems switched to a combination of MR cum presidentialism. 
It should make us cautious that it is so difficult to show that democracies have a 
systematic advantage over autocracies in terms of growth rates. It should also 
make us wonder how it is possible that a number of constitutional rules have 
significant effects on fiscal policies and a number of governance indicators but 
fail to have a significant impact on either labor or total factor productivity. 
                                                                                                                                      
want to play the public goods game (standard game, with punishment, with reward). The authors 
explicitely call this preplay round “constitutional choice”. In Gürerk et al. (2005), individuals can 
choose the group to which they wish to belong. Choice thus takes place via “voting with your feet.” 
Güth et al. (2005) ask whether tax morale depends on the centralization/decentralization of the tax 
system and find that tax morale increases in decentralization. 
  If constitutions are interpreted as devices that create focal points, laboratory experiments could be 
used to determine the factors that influence the choice of specific rules (such as experience with 
specific rules). 60 
So, at the end of the day (and the paper), we come smack up against the question 
that is at the very core of constitutional economics: Do constitutions really 
matter? Can societies really improve their lot by agreeing on a specific set of 
rules? In answering this question, it is not sufficient to point at some empirical 
evidence that seems to indicate that the answer is yes. We need to be able to 
explain the difference between de jure rules and their de facto enforcement: What 
are the factors that change a couple of printed pages into a document around 
which collective decision making is organized? What are the factors that prevent 
the factual enforcement of constitutional rules? 
It might well be that the enforcement of some constitutional rules depends on the 
existence of “preconstitutional” rules. These could be the informal or internal 
institutions of a society. If such are fairly stable over time and of the sort 
unconducive to the implementation of (desirable) constitutional rules, then the 
factual effect of constitutions could be quite limited. 
The recent debate on “institutions vs. geography” could be recast as “constitutions 
vs. geography” in our context. Based on works such as Diamond (1997), scholars 
such as John McArthur and Jeffrey Sachs (2001) argue that it is geographical 
factors, including the climate and the disease environment, that determine the fate 
of societies. But even if geography is a hard constraint, variation in economic 
development between geographically similar areas can be substantial, at least in 
the short and medium term. Just witness the differences in development between 
North and South Korea or between former East Germany and West Germany. 
Additionally, it seems plausible to assume that a society’s physical environment is 
an important determinant of its informal institutions. If these are an important 
factor in explaining the factual implementation of constitutional rules, as argued 
above, then “geography” might, indeed, provide at least a partial explanation of 
the choice of constitutional rules. 
Much of CPE research implicitly assumes the nation-state to be the “natural” form 
of statehood, even though supranational and international agreements are 
becoming ever more important. There are various possibilities for incorporating 
these agreements into CPE. One example is to view them as a new level in a 
multilevel governance structure, as has been done by some social scientists as 
well as legal scholars. One can then analyze under what conditions politicians of 
the nation-state level are ready to delegate competence to a supranational or 
international level (Voigt and Salzberger 2002 is a first attempt at analyzing 
delegation decisions from a CPE point of view, conceptualizing delegation to 
national bureaus and to international organizations as an alternative). This 61 
positive approach needs to be complemented by some normative analysis, 
however, and to date, in the discussions over Europe’s constitutional future, 
contributions by economists have been rather scarce (see, however, the early 
contribution by the “European Constitutional Group”). The European Union is 
only the most obvious supranational development. Analyzing international 
organizations such as the World Financial Organizations or the United Nations 
from a CPE perspective should also be highly relevant. 
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 Table 3: Empirical Results at a Glance: Constitutional Rules as Explanatory Variables, Cross-Country Results Unless Otherwise Noted 
  Dependent Variables  Constitutional Rule  Source  Result  # of Countries, Method, 
Period, … 
I  Macro Outcome Variables         
1 Economic  Growth         
    (Factual) Judicial Independence  Feld & Voigt (2003)  +, *  OLS, N=73 
    Decentralization (of revenue) Enikopolov  &  Zhuravskaya 
(2003) 
-,   OLS, N=73 
    Decentralization (of revenue)  Thießen (2003b)  -, *  GLS, N=26 
    Decentralization (of revenue) Thießen  (2003b)  Hump-
shape 
Panel, N=26, 1975–95 
    Decentralization (of spending)  Davoodi & Zou (1998)  -, (*)  N=46 
    Decentralization (of spending)  Thießen (2003a)  +, *  OLS, N=25 
    Number of Veto Players  Henisz (2000)  +, *  OLS, N=82, 1965–90 
2  Per Capita Income         
3 Labor  Productivity         
    Proportional Representation  PT (2003)  +, (*)  OLS, N=74 
    Proportion of Individually Elected 
Candidates 
PT (2003)  +, *  OLS, N=73 
    Size of Electoral District  PT (2003)  -, *  OLS, N=73 
    Presidential Form of Government  PT (2003)  -, (*)  OLS, N=74 
    Presidential Form of Government  Blume et al. (2009)  -, _  OLS, N=79 
4  Total Factor Productivity         
    Proportional Representation  PT (2003)  +, _  OLS, N=73 
    Proportion of Individually Elected 
Candidates 
PT (2003)  +, _  OLS, N=72 
    Size of Electoral District  PT (2003)  -, *  OLS, N=72 
    Presidential Form of Government  PT (2003)  -, _  OLS, N=73 
    Presidential Form of Government  Blume et al. (2009)  -, *  OLS, N=79 
    Direct Democracy (fiscal referendums)  Feld & Savioz (1997)#  +, *  GLS, N=26 
II  Fiscal Policy Variables         
1 Government  Revenue         
    Proportional Representation  PT (2003)  +, _  OLS, N=76 
   Proportional  Representation  Blume  et al. (2009)  +, (*)  OLS, N=78 
    Presidential Form of Government  PT (2003)  -, *  OLS, N=76 
    Presidential Form of Government  Blume et al. (2009)  -, _  OLS, N=78 74 
   Decentralization  Feld  et al. (2003)#  -, *  Panel,  TSLS,  N=26,  1980–
98 
  State and Local Tax Revenue  Direct Democracy (initiative)  Matsusaka (1995)#  -, *  Panel, OLS, N=49, 1960–90 
    Direct Democracy (mandatory fiscal 
referendums) 
Feld & Kirchgässner (2001)#  -, *  Panel, OLS, N=26, 1986–97 
2  A. Central Government Expenditure          
    Proportional Representation  PT (2003)  +, *  OLS, N=80 
    Presidential Form of Government  PT (2003)  -, *  OLS, N=80 
    Bicameral Legislature  Bradbury & Crain (2001)  -, *  WLS, N=37, 1971–89 
    Bicameral Legislature  Plümper & Martin (2003)  -, *  OLS, N=83, 1975–97 
  B. Total Government Expenditure         
   Proportional  Representation  Blume  et al. (2009)  +, _  OLS, N=77 
    Presidential Form of Government  Blume et al. (2009)  -, _  OLS, N=77 
    Federalism (“own source” revenue)  Rodden (2003)  -, *  Panel, N=44, 1980–93 
    Direct Democracy (mandatory referendums)  Blume et al. (2009)  -, *  OLS, N=62 
    Direct Democracy (possibility initiative)  Blume et al. (2009)  +, *  OLS, N=62 
  C. State and Local Gov. Expenditure  Direct Democracy (initiative)  Matsusaka (1995)#  -, *  Panel, OLS, N=49, 1960–90 
    Direct Democracy (mandatory fiscal 
referendums) 
Feld & Kirchgässner (2001)#  -, *  Panel, OLS, N=26, 1986–97 
3 Budget  Deficit         
    Proportional Representation  PT (2003)  +, *  OLS, N=60 
    Direct Democracy (frequency of use)  Blume et al. (2009)  -, *  OLS, N=45 
4  Composition of Government Spending         
  A Transfers (Social Security plus Subsidies 
to Firms) 
Proportional Representation (district size)  Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2002)  +, *  OLS, N=40  
  B Social Security and Welfare  Proportional Representation  PT (2003)  ?, _  OLS, N=56 
    Presidential Form of Government  PT (2003)  -, (*)  OLS, N=56/69 
III  Governance Variables         
1 Corruption         
    Proportion of Individually Elected 
Candidates 
PT (2003)  -, *  WLS, N=68 
    Size of Electoral District  PT (2003)  +, *  WLS, N=68 
    Presidential Form of Government  PT (2003)  -, _   
    Presidential Form of Government  Gerring & Thacker (2004)  +, *  WLS, N=125 
    Presidential Form of Government  Lederman et al. (2005)  +, *  Probit/OLS, 1987–97 
    Bicameral Legislature  Testa (2007)  -, *  Panel, N=34, 1996–2000 
    Federalism (fiscal decentralization)  Treisman (2007)  No  effects,  OLS, N=54, 2005 75 
_ 
    Direct Democracy (initiative)  Alt & Lassen (2003)#  -, *  OLS, N=45 
2 Graft         
    Proportion of Individually Elected 
Candidates 
PT (2003)  -, *  WLS, N=78 
    Size of Electoral District  PT (2003)  +, *  WLS, N=78 
    Presidential Form of Government  PT (2003)  -, *  WLS, N=78 
    Presidential Form of Government  Blume et al. (2009)  -, _  WLS, N=79 
    Number of Veto Players  Panizza (2001)  -, *  TSLS, N=111 
IV  Others        
1  Legitimacy of Constitution/State         
2  Propensity to Cheat on Taxes         
    Direct Democracy (mandatory referendums)  Blume et al. (2009)  -, *  OLS, N=49 
3  Reported Life Satisfaction (“Happiness”)         
    Direct Democracy (  Frey & Stutzer (2006)#  +, *  WLS, N=6,134 
    Direct Democracy (various measures)  Lascher & Wassmer (2007)#  No  effects, 
_ 
Various, N = up to 2,324 
    Direct Democracy (various measures)  Blume et al. (2009)  No  effects, 
_ 
OLS, N=54 
+/- = sign of coefficient in corresponding regression; * = claimed to be significant; (*) = marginally significant; _ = claimed to be insignificant “#” refers to within country studies. 